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Many commentators have observed that when we speak of "the
Warren Court," we mean the Warren Court that lasted from 1962
(when Arthur Goldberg replaced Felix Frankfurter) to 1969 (when
Earl Warren retired).' But when we speak of the Warren Court's
"revolution" in American criminal procedure we mean the Warren
Court that lasted from 1961 (when the landmark case of Mapp v.
1. See, e.g., THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLTICAL PERSPECIVE 7 (Mark

Tushnet ed., 1993).
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Ohio2 was decided) to 1966 or 1967.1 In its final years, the Warren
Court was not the same Court that had handed down Mapp or
Miranda v. Arizona.4
Ti

CLOSING YEARS OF THE WARREN COURT ERA

The last years of the Warren Court constituted a period of social

upheaval marked by urban riots, disorders on college campuses, eversoaring crime statistics, ever-spreading fears of the breakdown of public order, and assassinations and near-assassinations of public figures.5
Moreover, the strong criticism of the Court by many members of Congress and by presidential candidate Richard Nixon and the obviously
retaliatory provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 contributed further to an atmosphere that was unfavorable to6the continued vitality of the Warren Court's mission in criminal
cases.

In its closing years the Warren Court: upheld the so-called informer's privilege (allowing the government to withhold the identity
of its informant at a suppression hearing);7 rejected the general assumption that errors of constitutional magnitude were not subject to
the harmless error rule;8 emphatically reaffirmed the doctrine that a
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: IndividualRights and
Law Enforcement, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 12 (1988) (observing that in the field of criminal
procedure "the 'real Warren Court"' emerged with the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961)). Some might argue that the Warren Court's revolution in criminal procedure
commenced with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (establishing an indigent criminal
defendant's right to a free transcript on appeal, at least under certain circumstances). Griffin did
foreshadow some of the cases handed down by the later Warren Court, but "it was only some
years after [this] decision that a majority of the Court consistently took positions now regarded
as characteristic of the Warren Court." Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for PenalJustice:
The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 519 n.4.
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. See FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SEF-INFLICrED WOUND 14-16 (1970); Allen, supra note 3,
at 539.
6. See GRAHAM supra note 5, at 12, 14; Allen supra note 3, at 539. See also CRAIG M.
BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 29-30 (1993); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF EARL WARREN AND HIs SUPREME COURT - A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY

762-63 (1983).

7. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). The Court allowed the government to withhold
the identity of its informant even when, as in McCray, the police acted without a warrant.
Where, apart from police testimony as to information supplied by an unidentified informer,
there is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause, there is much to be said for utilizing an
in camera hearing, thus protecting the government from any impairment of necessary secrecy,
yet still protecting the defendant from what could have been serious police misconduct. But the
McCray Court did not suggest such.a procedure. See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.3(g) (2d ed. 1987).
8. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 26.6 (c)-(e) (1984).
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defendant lacked "standing" to challenge evidence seized in violation
of a third party's constitutional rights 9 (although such a requirement
seemed inconsistent with the deterrence theory of the exclusionary
rule, which had gained ascendancy, and most commentators had urged
abolition of the "standing" requirement 0 ); and repudiated the "mere
evidence" rule, the rule banning the seizure of objects of "evidentiary
value" only," thus clearing the way for a system of court-ordered
electronic surveillance that could satisfy Fourth Amendment standards. 2 (The following year, 1968, Congress granted law enforcement
authorities broad powers to conduct continuing electronic surveillance
for up to thirty days, with extensions possible. 13)
The Warren Court's performance in the field of criminal procedure does not fall into neat categories. The defense did win some victories in the late 1960s,' 4 but then it had lost some important cases
earlier,' 5 when the revolution in criminal procedure was supposed to
be at its peak. Nevertheless, I think that, in the main, the revolution
ended a couple of years before Earl Warren stepped down as Chief
6

Justice.'

9. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
10. See generally 4 LAFAvE, supra note 7, at § 11.3; Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the
Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "PrincipledBasis" Rather than an "EmpiricalProposition"?, 16
CRIGHrroN L. REv. 565, 633-38 (1983).
11. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), overruling Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921).
12. So long as Gouled remained on the books, once electronic surveillance was deemed
Fourth Amendment activity, any proposal for law enforcement tapping and bugging, however
carefully circumscribed, would have violated the rule articulated in Gouled, that objects of "evidentiary value only" (as opposed to the instrumentalities or the proceeds of crime) are beyond
the reach of an otherwise valid warrant. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1921).
13. See generally Herman Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The
Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MicH. L. REv. 455 (1969).
14. As Professor Bradley has stated, in the final year of Chief Justice Warren's tenure the
Court did significantly limit the scope of searches incident to arrest, Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969), and did impose substantial restrictions on the issuance of search warrants,
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). BRADLEY, supra note 6, at 32.
15. To take one notable example, the Warren Court found no constitutional restrictions on
the government's power to utilize spies and undercover agents. It took the position, a viewpoint
the Burger Court was to share in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), that one who
speaks to another not only assumes the risk that his listener will later make public what he has
heard but also takes the risk that his listener will electronically record or simultaneously transmit
what he is hearing. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966).
16. But see BRADLEY, supranote 6, at 32 (maintaining that "despite the existence of powerful societal pressures" to end its reformation of the law of criminal procedure, the Warren Court
never lost its zeal to continue the reformation).
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The Chief Justice's majority opinion in Terry v. Ohio,17 an important 1968 "stop and frisk" case, is a dramatic demonstration of the
Warren Court's change in tone and attitude. Seven years earlier, of
course, the Warren Court had imposed the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule on the states as a matter of constitutional law." a But the
Court was a good deal less exuberant about the exclusionary rule in
1968, when it upheld the police practice of "stopping" and "frisking"
persons on less than probable cause to believe they were engaged in
criminal activity. It recognized, almost poignantly, that "[tihe exclusionary rule has its limitations... as a tool of judicial control."' 9
I truly believe that if say, in 1971, the Burger Court had written
the same opinion in the "stop and frisk" cases that the Warren Court
wrote in 1968, the Burger Court would have caught heavy fire for
leaving the lower courts without adequate guidance concerning a
widespread police practice. Further, its opinion would have been considered solid evidence of the emerging counterrevolution in criminal
procedure. 20
The Warren Court's approach in the 1968 "stop and frisk" cases
contrasts sharply with the approach it had taken only two years earlier
in Miranda.2 ' There, greatly troubled by the lower courts' persistence
in utilizing the ambiguity of the "voluntariness"-"totality of the circumstances" test to uphold confessions of doubtful constitutionality,
the Court sought to replace the unruly traditional test with a relatively
concrete and easily administered rule. But the "stop and frisk" cases
established such a spongy test, one that allowed the police so much
room to maneuver and furnished the courts so little bases for meaningful review, that the opinion must have been cause for celebration in
a goodly number of police stations. 22 (At one point, for example, the
Court said that an officer could frisk when he observes "unusual conduct" which leads him to conclude that "criminal activity may be
23
afoot" and that the suspect may be armed and dangerous.)
17. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also Sibron v. New York and Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968) (companion cases).
18. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13.
20. Cf. Alan M. Dershowitz & John H. Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candorand Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1199 (1971).
21. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
22. See generally Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron,
Peters, and Beyond, 67 MicL L. REv. 39 (1968).
23. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. At another point, the Court articulated an even vaguer standard
and did so "negatively":

HeinOnline -- 31 Tulsa L.J. 5 1995-1996

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

THE

[Vol. 31:1

RELEVANCE OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS

As the late A. Kenneth Pye observed in the closing years of the
Warren Court Era, "[t]he Court's concern with criminal procedure can
be understood only in the context of the struggle for civil rights."24 As
Dean Pye explained:
It is hard to conceive of a Court that would accept the challenge of
guaranteeing the rights of Negroes and other disadvantaged groups
to equality before the law and at the same time do nothing to ameliorate the invidious discrimination between rich and poor which existed in the criminal process. It would have been equally anomalous
for such a Court to ignore the clear evidence that members of disadvantaged groups generally bore the brunt of most unlawful police
activity.
If the Court's espousal of equality before the law was to be credible, it required not only that the poor African-American be permitted
to vote and to attend a school with whites, but also that he and other
disadvantaged individuals be able to exercise, as well as possess,
the
25
same rights as the affluent white when suspected of crime.
Moreover, as another commentator, writing at a time when the
African-Americans' struggle for civil rights and the response to that
struggle by law enforcement officials were still vivid memories,
observed:
What we have seen in the South is the perversion of the criminal
process into an instrument of official oppression. The discretion
which, we are reminded so often, is essential to the healthy operation of law enforcement agencies has been repeatedly abused in the
South: by police, by prosecutors, by judges and juries.... We have
had many reminders from abroad that law enforcement may be
used for evil as well as for beneficent purposes; but the experience
in the South during the last decade has driven home
26 the lesson that
law enforcement unchecked by law is tyrannous.
We cannot say [the officer's decision] to seize Terry and pat his clothing for weapons
was the product of a volatile or inventive imagination, or was undertaken simply as an
act of harassment; the record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the
course of an investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself
and others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do so.
ld.
at 28.
24. A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure,67 MIcH. L. REv. 249, 256
(1968). See also Allen, supranote 3, at 523 (stating that although charges of inequality have not
been confined to the criminal law, but have encompassed nearly every aspect of society, such
charges "possess an even sharper bite when they are hurled at a system that employs as its
sanctions the deprivation of property, of liberty, and, on occasion, of life itself.").
25. Pye, supra note 24, at 256.
26. Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, the Police,and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CiwM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLIcE Sci. 238, 240 (1966).
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When one thinks of "equal justice," the famous case of Gideon v.
Wainwright27 comes first to mind, but Miranda should not be overlooked. Especially when viewed against the background of Escobedo
v. llinois28 (decided two years earlier), Miranda, too, may be regarded as an "equal justice" case.
In Escobedo the Court extended the right to counsel to the preindictment stage, but it was unclear whether the right to counsel came
into play "when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession ' 29 or when the process so shifts and one or more of the limiting
facts in Escobedo are also present. 30 Mr. Escobedo had hired a lawyer
(indeed, the lawyer had arrived in the stationhouse and had tried unsuccessfully to meet with his client). Moreover, although not advised
of his right to counsel, Mr. Escobedo had requested an opportunity to
meet with his lawyer, but that request had been denied.
Although Escobedo grew out of a set of unusual facts, and arguably could be limited to these facts, the opinion had broad implications and at some places contained sweeping language. How
grudgingly or expansively would the Court read this case? Would one
who, unlike Mr. Escobedo, could not afford to hire a lawyer,3 ' get the
benefit of Escobedo? Would the person who, unlike Mr. Escobedo,
was not smart enough or alert enough to ask for a lawyer on his own
initiative fall under the protection of Escobedo?
Unhappy with Escobedo and its potential for expansion, many in
the "legal establishment" maintained that the case should be read narrowly or limited to its special facts. In short, on the eve of Miranda,
27. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (entitling indigent criminal defendants to free counsel, at least in

serious cases). Whether the Burger Court "expanded" or "contracted" Gideon is debatable.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), applied Gideon to instances where defendant is imprisoned for any offense, but Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require only that no indigent misdemeanant be incarcerated unless he is
afforded the right to counsel. A fairly generous reading of Gideon, the day after it was decided,
would have been that it applies to all crimes except "petty offenses." The Burger Court went
beyond this generous reading of Gideon in one respect (Argersinger), but fell short in another
(Scott).
28. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
29. Id. at 492.
30. For a summary of the wide disagreement over the meaning of Escobedo - and over
what it ought to mean - see YALE KAMusAR,POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: EsSAYS IN LAv AND PoLIcY 161-62 (1980) (hereinafter KAMISAR ESSAYS).

31. About half of all felony defendants are indigent; in some urban jurisdictions the indigency rate is in the 70-85% range. See YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27 (8th ed., 1994).
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many were trying to use the inability to afford a lawyer and the ignorance of one's rights as convenient valves to limit the impact of a pre32
cedent they did not like.
As we all know, this attempt failed. As Judge Henry J. Friendly,
perhaps the most formidable critic of the Warren Court's criminal procedure cases, has noted, the equal protection argument is "a ground
bass that resounds throughout the Miranda opinion. '33 To quote
Judge Friendly, as the Miranda Court saw it:
Equality [in the interrogation room] could be established only by
advancing the point at which the privilege became applicable and
surrounding the poor man with safeguards in the way of warning
and counsel that would put him more nearly on a par with the rich
maln and the professional criminal.3a
At her recent confirmation hearings, it is worth noting, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg defended Miranda largely on "equal protection" grounds:
[The Miranda warnings provide information about] constitutional
rights that should be brought home to every defendant.
Now, sophisticated defendants will know them without being told,
but the unsophisticated won't....
[The Miranda rules provide] an assurance that people know their
rights. It is an assurance that the law is going to be administered
even-handedly because, as I said, sophisticated defendants who
have counsel ordinarily will know about their rights .... 35
CRITICISM OF

IRAArDA -

FROM OPPOsITE DIRECTIONS

In Gideon, twenty-two state attorneys general filed an amicus
brief on behalf of the defendant. But in Miranda and its companion
cases twenty-six state attorneys general joined in an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to "go slow" and to allow changes in the police-interrogation-confessions area to develop in nonconstitutional
32. See Yale Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney General Behind? - The BazelonKatzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality and the Administration of CriminalJustice, 54 Ky.L.J.
464, 480-84 (1966) (pre-Miranda). See also Richard H. Kuh, Panelists' Comments, 54 Ky. LJ.
499, 506-07 (1966) (responding to the Kamisar paper).
33. Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. C. L. REV. 671,711 (1968). See also Jesse H. Choper, On the Warren Courtand
JudicialReview, 17 CATH.U. L. REV. 20, 34-35 (1967).
34. Friendly, supra note 33, at 711.
35. The Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsbergto be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, Hearings on S. 103482 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 327 (1993).
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terms.3 6 Although this led one observer to say that "the states had

made a U-turn since Gideon, 37 that was hardly the case.
The twenty-two attorneys general who sided with Mr. Gideon did
so on the understanding, inter alia, that the new constitutional right to
appointed counsel in non-capital cases would not "attach" until the
judicial process had begun.3" The amicus brief concluded by urging
the Court to "require that all persons tried for a felony in state court"
be afforded the right to counsel.39 In Miranda,however, the attorneys
general were afraid that the Court would carry the "equality principle" to the point where it really bites - the police station.
That is why Gideon was a case that received much applause, but
Mirandawas the case that galvanized opposition to the Warren Court
into a potent political force.4 0 It cannot be denied that Miranda is a
much-maligned case,4 1 but it is also a much misunderstood one.
One source of confusion may have been that the Miranda Court
led a goodly number to believe that it was "building on" and expanding Escobedo when it was actually making a "fresh start."4 2 As
already indicated, at some places the majority opinion in Escobedo
launched such a broad attack on the government's reliance on confessions that it threatened (or promised) to eliminate virtually all police
interrogation of suspects. At one point, for example, in the course of
rejecting the argument that if a suspect were entitled to a lawyer prior
36. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLnCS 109 (1983).

37.
38.
wright,
39.
40.

Id.
See Brief for the State Governments, Amici Curiae at 2-3, 16, 21-23, Gideon v. Wain372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
Miranda"plunge[d) the Court into an ocean of abuse" and made it "one of the leading

issues of the 1968 Presidential campaign." JErHRO K. LrEBERMAN, MILESTONES OF AMERICAN LAWv 326 (1976).

200 YEARS

41. Miranda, one commentator has observed, "must rank as the most bitterly criticized,
most contentious, and most diversely analyzed criminal procedure decision by the Warren
Court." HENRY J. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 125 (4th ed. 1982).

42. At one point for example, 384 U.S. at 444, after defining "custodial interrogation" "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" - the Court dropped an
obfuscating footnote [fn. 4]: "This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which has focused on an accused." This footnote suggested that "custody" and "focus" were
alternative grounds for requiring the warnings, but these are very different events and they have
very different consequences. See Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., What is "CustodialInterrogation"?,
14 UCLA L. REv. 59, 114 (1966); Yale Kamisar, "CustodialInterrogation"Within the Meaning of
Miranda, in CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 335, 338-51 (1968); Geoffrey R. Stone, The

Miranda Doctrinein the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 149. The likely explanation for
footnote 4 was the MirandaCourt's effort to maintain some continuity with a much-publicized
and much-discussed recent precedent.
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to indictment or formal charge, the number of confessions obtained by
the police would be greatly reduced, the Escobedo Court retorted:
The fact that many confessions are obtained during this period
points up its critical nature as a "stage when legal aid and advice"
are surely needed. The right to counsel would indeed be hollow if it
began at a period when few confessions were obtained.43
At another point, the Court observed:
We have learned the lesson of history... that a system of criminal
law enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession" will, in
the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured
through skillful investigation....
..No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware
of, and exercise these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights
will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then
there is something very wrong with that system. 44
The sweeping language and broad implications of Escobedo
greatly troubled, one might even say alarmed, most law enforcement
officials and many members of the bench and bar. Thus, on the eve of
Miranda, a case that was to reexamine Escobedo and to clarify its
meaning and scope, the nation's most respected lower-court judges
(Charles Breitel, Henry Friendly, Walter Schaefer and Roger Traynor)
spoke publicly in anticipation of the Court's ruling and urged the
Court to turn back or at least to reconsider where it was going. 45 Justice Schaefer, for example, voiced fear that "the doctrines converging
upon the institution of police interrogation are threatening to push on
to their logical conclusion - to the point where no questioning of
suspects will be permitted. ' 46 And Judge Friendly warned that "condition[ing] questioning on the presence of counsel is... really saying
43. Escobedo, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (Goldberg, J.).

44. Id. at 488-89 (emphasis added).
45. See Charles D. Breitel, CriminalLaw and EqualJustice, 1966 UTAH L. RaV. 1; Henry J.
Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,53 CAL L. REv. 929 (1965); WALTER V. SCHAEFER, Tim SusPEcT AND SOCIETY (1967) (based on lectures delivered two months
before Miranda); Roger J. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention,

and Trial, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 657 (1966). See also Forty-ThirdAnnual Meeting of the American
Law Institute, 1966 A.L.I. PRoc. 250-52 (remarks of Judge Friendly).
46. SCHAEFER, supra note 45, at 9. See also Symposium, 54 Ky. L.J. 464, 521, 523 (1966)
(pre-Miranda),where Justice Schaefer expressed the view that effective enforcement of the criminal law "is not compatible with a prohibition of station house interrogation or with the presence
of a lawyer during station house interrogation."
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that there may be no effective, immediate questioning by the police"
and "that is not a rule that society will long endure."47
The Warren Court did not turn back, but neither did it hand down
a ruling that these distinguished judges had anticipated and feared.
The Court did not flatly prohibit police questioning of suspects. Nor
did it condition such questioning on the presence of counsel. Nor did it
require that a suspect be advised of his rights by a defense lawyer or
by a disinterested magistrate.
The Court continued to move in the same general direction as it
had in Escobedo, but it "switched tracks" - it switched from a right
to counsel rationale (which threatened to culminate in a right not to
confess except with the tactical assistance of counsel) to a self-incrimination rationale (which gave the police more room to maneuver). A
right to counsel rationale had almost no stopping point, but a selfincrimination rationale did - it required governmental compulsion.
But many members of the media and the public did not realize
this. To them the important point was that the Court had not turned
back.
At the time of the decision, many overlooked what has become
increasingly clear in recent years - Mirandawas very much a "compromise" between the old "totality-of-circumstances" test for admitting confessions and extreme proposals that - as the fear (or hope)
was expressed at the time - would, in effect, have eliminated police
interrogation of suspects. As the Court, per O'Connor, J., pointed out
twenty years after the Miranda case, Miranda "attempted to reconcile" two "competing concerns" - the need for police questioning as
an effective law enforcement tool and the need to protect custodial
suspects from impermissible coercion.4"
Miranda left the police free to conduct general-on-the-scene
questioning even though the person being questioned was neither informed nor aware of his rights. And even when the suspect was in the
stationhouse and police interrogators were bent on eliciting confessions, it allowed them to obtain waivers of the right to remain silent
and the right to the assistance of counsel: (a) without the advice or
presence of counsel, (b) without the advice or presence of a judicial
47. 1966 A.L.I. PROC., supra note 45, at 250 (emphasis added).
48. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,426 (1986). "Declining to adopt the more extreme
position that the actual presence of a lawyer was necessary to dispel the coercion inherent in
custodial interrogation," continued Justice O'Connor, "the [Miranda]Court found that the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights could be adequately protected by less intrusive means." Id.
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officer, and (c) without any objective recording of the waiver transaction or the subsequent interrogation.49
At first Miranda was criticized for going too far. To a considerable extent, this was a result of the confusion over what the Court
actually did. Many thought that because it had not read Escobedo
narrowly, because it had not turned back, the Court had put additional restraints on the police. In short, to a considerable extent the
Warren Court was criticized for what its critics had anticipated it
would do (but what, it turned out, the Court did not really do).
In recent years, ironically, Miranda has been increasingly criticized for not going far enough - for example, for not requiring the
advice of counsel before a suspect can effectively waive his rights or
for not requiring a tape recording of how the warnings are delivered
and how the suspect responds and, if the suspect does effectively
waive his rights, for not tape recording the police questioning that
follows.50
There is a good deal to be said for this criticism, but these commentators do not seem to appreciate the fact that in 1966 the Court
was barely able to go as far as it did - that at the time it was probably
not possible to persuade a majority of the Court to go one inch further
than it did.51 Moreover, the liberal critics of Miranda do not seem to
realize that if, for example, the Court had explicitly required the police to make a tape recording or even a verbatim stenographic recording, of the crucial events it would have added much fuel to the
criticism that it was exercising undue control over police practices that it was "legislating."

49. See KAMISAR ESSAYS, supra note 30, at 88-89.

50. See Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmaticsof Powerlessness in Police Interrogation,103 YALE L.J. 259, 320-21 (1993); Allen, supra note 3, at 537-38; Charles J.
Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposalto Mirandize Miranda, 100
H~av. L. REv. 1826, 1842-45 (1987); Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Pro.
posal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 109-10 (1989); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MicH. L. REV. 865, 880-82 (1981). But cf Paul G.
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw.U. L. REV.

-

(1995)

(forthcoming) (maintaining that an electronic recording of police interrogation should be regarded as an alternative to Miranda).
51. At the March, 1966, conference on Miranda and related cases, Chief Justice Warren
emphasized that FBI agents regularly informed suspects of their rights (although the FBI warnings were not as extensive as the Mirandawarnings) and that the FBI practice had not imposed a
substantial burden on law enforcement. See SCHwARTZ, supranote 6, at 589. According to one
Justice who attended this conference, "the statement that the FBI did it ... was a swing factor... a tremendously important factor, perhaps the critical factor in the Miranda vote." Id.
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How DID MIRANDA FARE IN THE POST-WARREN COURT ERA?
Because Miranda was the centerpiece of the Warren Court's
"revolution" in American criminal procedure and the prime target of
those who thought the courts had become "soft" on criminals, almost
all Court watchers expected the so-called Burger Court to treat Miranda unkindly. They did not have to wait very long.
The Impeachment Cases
The first blows the Burger Court struck Mirandawere the rulings
in two impeachment cases, Harris v. New York" and Oregon v.
Hass.53 The Harris case held that statements preceded by defective
warnings, and thus inadmissible to establish the government's case-inchief, could nevertheless be used to impeach the defendant's credibility if he chose to take the stand in his own defense. 4 The Court
noted, but seemed unperturbed by the fact, that some language in the
Miranda opinion could be read as barring the use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda for any purpose.
The Court went a step beyond Harrisin the second impeachment
case, Hass. In this case, after being advised of his rights, the suspect
assertedhis right to counsel. Nevertheless, the police refused to honor
the request for a lawyer and continued to question the suspect. The
Court ruled that here, too, the resulting incriminating statements
could be used for impeachment purposes. Since many suspects make
incriminating statements even after the receipt of complete Miranda
warnings, Harrismight have been explained -

and contained -

on

the ground that permitting impeachment use of statements required
without complete warnings would not greatly encourage the police to
violate Miranda. But in light of the Hass ruling, when a suspect asserts his rights the police seem to have very little to lose and much to
gain by continuing to question him in violation of Miranda."
52. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The case is severely criticized in Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 20.
53. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
54. However, as indicated in Harris, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and subsequently made clear in
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), "involuntary" or "coerced statements," as opposed to
those obtained only in violation of Miranda,cannot be used for impeachment purposes.
55. The Court subsequently held that a defendant's pre-arrest silence could be used to impeach him when he testified in his own defense, Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240-41
(1980), and then, so long as he was not given the Miranda warnings, that even a defendant's
post-arrest silence could be used for impeachment purposes, Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607
(1983). Both Jenkins and Weir distinguished Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976), which
deemed it a violation of due process to use a defendant's silence for impeachment purposes
when the defendant remained silent after being given the Miranda warnings.
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The police need not advise a suspect of his rights unless they are
about to subject him to "custodial interrogation." The Burger Court
construed the key concepts "custody" and "custodial interrogation"
rather narrowly. If a suspect goes to the police station on his own
after an officer requests that he meet him there at a convenient time
or even if a suspect "voluntarily" agrees to accompany the police to
that site, police station questioning might
not be "custodial interroga56
Miranda.
of
meaning
the
within
tion"
What is"Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Miranda?
Another frequently litigated issue is what constitutes "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda? Considering the alternatives,
the Burger Court gave this key term a fairly generous reading in
Rhode Island v. Innis.57 The Court might have taken a mechanical
approach to Miranda and limited "interrogation," as some lower
courts had, to instances where the police directly question a suspect.
Or it might have limited interrogation to situations where the record
establishes that the police intended to elicit a response, a difficult test
for the defense to satisfy. The Court did neither. Instead, it held that
Miranda's safeguards are triggered whenever a person in custody is
subjected either to express questioning or its "functional equivalent"
- "interrogation" includes "any words or actions on the part of the
police [other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody] that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
58
response from the suspect.1
The meaning of "interrogation" arose in an interesting setting in
Illinois v. Perkins:59 Suppose a secret government agent, posing as a
fellow-prisoner, is placed in the same cell or cellblock with an incarcerated suspect and the secret agent induces the suspect to discuss the
56. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492
(1977). Cf.Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1526 (1994) (per curiam). See also Berkemer v.

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984) (explaining at considerable length why the "roadside questioning" of a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop is "substantially less 'police dominated"' than stationhouse interrogation and thus should not be considered "custodial
interrogation").
57. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). For a close examination of this case see Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REv.
1209 (1980).
58. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01. Although Innis involved police "speech," the Court's definition embraces police interrogation techniques that do not. Thus, the Court seems to have repudiated the position taken by a number of lower courts that confronting a suspect with physical
evidence or with an accomplice who has confessed is not interrogation because it does not entail
verbal conduct on the part of the police.
59. 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
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crime for which he has been arrested. Does this constitute "custodial
interrogation"within the meaning of Miranda? No, answered the Perkins Court; "Miranda warnings are not required when the suspect is
unaware that he is speaking
to a law enforcement officer and gives a
60
voluntary statement.
Although Perkins has been sharply criticized for giving Miranda
an unduly narrow reading and encouraging the police to use deception
in order to obtain "uninformed confessions, '61 I think the case was
correctly decided. It is the impact on the suspect's mind of the interplay between police interrogation and police custody - each condition reinforcing the pressures and anxieties produced by the other that makes custodial police interrogation inherently coercive. But in
the "jail plant" situation, there is no interplay between the two conditions where it counts - in the mind of the suspect.
Mirandawas designed to counter the inherent coercion generated
by a police-dominated environment. But how can it be said that a
suspect is enveloped in a police-dominated atmosphere when he has
no idea that the person with whom he is talking is a police officer or
an agent of the police? 62 That is why, I believe, the Court reached the
right result when it concluded that if it is not custodial police interrogation in the mind of the suspect, it is not such an interrogation within
the meaning of Miranda.63
The Edwards Case: A Victory for Miranda in the Post-Warren
Court Era
Although in the main the Burger Court interpreted and applied
Miranda begrudgingly, the 1981 case of Edwards v. Arizona' is a notable exception. Unlike most Mirandacases, which deal with the need
60. Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
61. See Fred Cohen, Miranda and Police Deception in Interrogation:A Comment on Illinois
v. Perkins, 26 CRAM. L. BULL. 534 (1990).
62. One can, however, deliberately elicit incriminating statements from a person without
having him realize it, which is what happened in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
The Massiah doctrine does prevent the government from "eliciting" or "inducing" incriminating
statements from a suspect whether or not he is aware that he is dealing with a government agent
(indeed, whether or not he is in custody), but only when "adversary criminal proceedings" have
commenced against that person (eg., he has been indicted or has appeared before a judicial
officer). To the surprise of many, the Burger Court invigorated the Massiah doctrine in several
respects. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,400-01 (1977) (often called the "Christian Burial
Speech" case); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273 (1980). But cf. Kuhlmann v. Wilson,
477 U.S. 436, 456 (1986).
63. For a pre-Perkins discussion of "surreptitious interrogation" and the "jail plant" situation, see KAMIsARz ESSAYS supra note 30, at 195-96.

64. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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for, or the adequacy of, the warnings or the effectiveness of the suspect's alleged waiver of rights in immediate response to the warnings,
Edwards involved what have been called "second level" Miranda safeguards - those procedures Miranda tells us should be followed when
a suspect does assert his rights.65
In Edwards, the Burger Court gladdened the hearts of Miranda
supporters by invigorating that case in an important respect. It held
that when a suspect effectively asserts his right to a lawyer (as opposed to his right to remain silent) 66 he may not be subjected to further police interrogation "until counsel has been made available to
him, unless [he] himself initiatesfurther communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police." 67 In other words, once a suspect effectively exercises his right to counsel, the police cannot try to change the
suspect's mind; they must wait to see whether he changes his mind on
his own initiative. A valid waiver of the right to counsel cannot be
established by showing only that the suspect responded further to police-initiated custodial interrogation even though he was given a fresh
set of Miranda warnings at a subsequent interrogation session.
Edwards has been called "the Burger Court's first clear-cut victory for Miranda.'6 s Indeed, Edwards (and its progeny) may be called
the only clear-cut victory for Miranda since the Warren Court disbanded. It is a formidable rule, one that must worry even the most
experienced interrogator, and in recent years it has become still more
formidable - in some respects.
The rule applies even when the police want to question a suspect
about a crime unrelated to the subject of their initial interrogation.69
Moreover, as the Court recently held in Minnick v. Mississippi,7" once
a suspect invokes his right to counsel the police may not reinitiate
65. See People v. Grant, 380 N.E.2d 257, 259-60 (N.Y. 1978).

66. Six years earlier, the Court held in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975), that
if a suspect asserts his "right to silence" (as opposed to his right to counsel), under certain circumstances the police may, if they cease questioning on the spot, "try again" and succeed at a
later interrogation session. Although the Edwards Court tried hard to distinguish Mosley, I do
not think the two cases can be satisfactorily reconciled. See JESSE H. CHOPER, YALE KAMISAR
& LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE SUPREME CouR-r TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1982-83 at 153-58
(1984) (remarks of Kamisar). The average person has no idea that different procedural safeguards are triggered by saying "I don't want to say anything until I see a lawyer" rather than "I
don't want to say anything" or "I don't want to talk to the police."
67. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
68. David A. Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13
Loy. U. Cm.LJ.405,447 (1982). See also Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Miranda,
Minnick and the Morality of Confessions, 19 AM. J. CGrM. L. 1 (1991).
69. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
70. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
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interrogation in the absence of counsel even if the
suspect has been
71
allowed to consult with an attorney in the interim.
The Weaknesses in the Edwards Rule
The post-Warren Supreme Court gave us Edwards, but the Court
giveth and the Court taketh away. The Court has created two significant weaknesses in the Edwards rule (or, if one prefers to state it another way, allowed two good-sized weaknesses in the rule to develop).
The Court has told us that even though a suspect had earlier inyoked his right to counsel and at no time had explicitly "invited" or
"initiated" conversation about the subject matter of the case, he may
furnish the police an opportunity to recommence interrogation simply
by asking an officer, "What's going to happen to me now?" or presumably, "What comes next?"'72 Such comments strike me as expressions of concern, anxiety or confusion normally attendant to arrest,
removal from the scene of arrest, or transportation to the stationhouse
not evidence of a generalized desire or willingness to discuss the
subject matter of the investigation. Nevertheless, according to the
Court, these simple and understandable questions dismantle the safeguards established by Edwards.
The other substantial gap in the Edwards rule created by the
Court (or at least not filled by it) is the very recent decision in Davis v.
United States.7 3 In this case the Court drew a sharp line between those
suspects who "clearly" assert their right to counsel (thereby triggering
Edwards) and those who only make an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney that might or might not be an assertion of the
right to counsel. (E.g., "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" or "Do you
think I need an attorney here?") In the latter situation the police may
immediately begin interrogating the suspect without asking any questions designed to clarify whether the suspect really meant to invoke
his right to counsel.
I believe the approach adopted by the Davis Court is unsound.
An ambiguous reference to counsel should not be totally ignored because it fails to satisfy a certain level of clarity. The police should be
71. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts' reinvigoration of Miranda'sright to counsel prong in
general and the Minnick decision in particular have been explained on the ground that while
other features of Miranda "are for the benefit of the social underclass," the right to counsel
before and during custodial interrogation is "a safeguard that benefits a far broader segment of
society." Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 68, at 33.
72. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983).
73. 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994).
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required to respond to such references by asking narrow clarifying
questions designed to ascertain whether the suspect actually wishes to
assert his right to a lawyer. Otherwise, the right to counsel turns not
on the suspect's choice, but on the clarity with which he expresses that
choice. 74
Sociolinguistic research indicates that certain discrete segments of
the population, such as women and a number of minority racial and
ethnic groups, are far more likely than other groups to avoid strong,
assertive means of expression and to use indirect and hedged speech
patterns that give the impression of uncertainty or equivocalityZ5
Moreover, since the custodial police interrogation setting involves an
imbalance of power between the suspect and his interrogator(s), such
a setting increases the likelihood that a suspect will adopt an indirect
or hedged - and thus ambiguous - means of expression. Even
within speech communities whose members do not ordinarily use indirect modes of expression, one who is situationally powerless, i.e.,
aware of the dominant power of the person he is addressing, may also
adopt a hedging speech register. To borrow a phrase from Justice
Souter's concurring opinion in Davis (really a dissent on this issue), a
custodial suspect, one who will usually be experiencing considerable
stress and anxiety, should not be expected or required to "speak with
the discrimination of an Oxford don."7 6
Edwards is a formidable rule - if a suspect is lucky enough not
to ask an officer what is going to happen to him next or careful
enough to assert his right to counsel with sufficient precision and directness. The trouble with the rule is that its application turns on very
fine, subtle distinctions - too fine and too subtle for the real world.
Those suspects who fall under the rule of Edwards will be well protected by its thick armor. But many similarly situated suspects will fall
outside the rule because it has a soft underbelly.
74. At this point, I am relying heavily on the Federal Government's brief in the Davis case.
See Brief for the United States at 14, 19-20, 32-35, Davis v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994)
(No. 92-1949). Since the agents of the Naval Investigative Service had asked Mr. Davis, a member of the U.S. Navy, clarifying questions when he made an ambiguous reference to counsel, and
Davis had then made it plain that he did not want a lawyer, all the government needed to win its
case, and all it sought, was for the Court to adopt a middle-of-the road approach, under which
the police have to respond to a suspect's ambiguous references to counsel by asking follow-up
clarifying questions. One of the most troubling features of the Davis case is that the Court
reached out to adopt a rule that the government explicitly and forcefully rejected - a policeoriented rule that an interrogator may completely disregard a suspect's ambiguous references to
a lawyer.
75. See Ainsworth, supra note 50, at 315-22.
76. 114 S.Ct. at 2364.

HeinOnline -- 31 Tulsa L.J. 18 1995-1996

1995]

THE WARREN COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

19

I am fairly confident that the Court that decided Miranda would
have rejected the exceptions to the Edwards rule that have developed
in recent years. On the other hand, I have to say (and I never thought
I would say this about a Miranda case in the post-Warren Court era),
that I think Minnick may go too far in favor of the defense. 77 To put it
another way, I believe at least some members of the Mirandamajority
would have balked at the application of the Edwards rule to the Minnick fact situation.
If a suspect requests a lawyer and, unlike the situation in Edwards
and other cases, the police do as he asks - actually permit or bring
about a meeting between the suspect and his lawyer - why can't the
police approach the suspect a second time and give him a fresh set of
warnings? Under these circumstances a suspect has more reason to
believe than most suspects do that if he asserts his right to counsel at
the second session the police will honor that right. They already did
so once before. Why would they not do so again?
What Does it Mean to Say That the Miranda Rules Are Merely
"Prophylactic"?
Although supporters of Miranda were troubled by the "impeachment" cases and by decisions giving "custody" and "custodial interrogation" a narrow reading, they were troubled still more by Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Michiganv. Tucker.78 Tucker was
a mild case of police misconduct - a very attractive case from the
prosecution's point of view. First of all, the police questioning occurred before Miranda was decided, although the defendant's trial
took place afterward. Thus, Miranda was just barely applicable.79
Second, Tucker dealt with the admissibility not of the defendant's own
statements -

they had been excluded

-

but only with the testimony

of a witness whose identity had been discovered by questioning the
suspect without giving him a complete set of Miranda warnings.
Under the circumstances, the Court held that the witness's testimony was admissible. Tucker can be read very narrowly, but the majority opinion contains a good deal of mischievous broad language.
77. But see Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 68, at 21-22, 31-34.
78. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
79. The Court held, a week after Miranda,that Mirandaaffected only those cases in which
the trial began after that decision. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966). The Court
probably should have held that Mirandaaffected only those confessions obtained after the date
of the decision.
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The Tucker majority seemed to equate the "compulsion" barred
by the privilege against self-incrimination with "coercion" or "involuntariness" under the pre-Miranda "totality of circumstances" test.80
This is quite misleading. Much harsher police methods were needed
to render a confession "coerced" or "involuntary" under the pre-Miranda test than are necessary to make a confession "compelled"
within the meaning of the self-incrimination clause.8 ' That, at least, is
the premise of Miranda.
That was why the old "voluntariness" test for the admissibility of
confessions was abandoned in favor of Miranda. That is why law enforcement officials so fiercely resisted the application of the self-incrimination clause to custodial police interrogation. And that is why,
although his questioning had been mild compared to the oppressive
and offensive police methods that had rendered statements inadmissible in the older confession, Ernesto Miranda's confession was held
inadmissible.82
By lumping together self-incrimination "compulsion" and preMiranda "involuntariness" or "coercion" and then declaring that a
Miranda violation is not necessarily a violation of the self-incrimination clause - it only is if the confession was "involuntary" under
traditional standards8 3 - the Tucker majority rejected the core premise of Miranda.' If this view of Mirandawere correct, then it is hard
to see what that landmark case would have accomplished by applying
the privilege against self-incrimination to the proceedings in the police
station.
There is another troubling aspect to Tucker. In the course of
holding that under the circumstances of the case the witness's testimony was admissible, the Court "recognized" that the Mirandawarnings "were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution," but
only "prophylactic standards" designed to "safeguard" or to "provide
practical reinforcement" for the privilege against self-incrimination.85
This is not quite accurate.
80. See 417 U.S. at 444-46.
81. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 435, 440-46
(1987). See also Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practice" Phases of the Criminal Process and the
Three Phases of the Burger Cour4 in Tnm BURGER YEARS 143, 152-53 (Herman Schwartz ed.
1987).
82. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58.
83. See 417 U.S. at 444-45.
84. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. Cr.Rv.
99, 118-19.
85. See 417 U.S. at 444.
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The Miranda Court did observe that the Constitution does not
"require adherence to any particularsolution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted," 6 but it
quickly added: "However, unless we are shown other procedures
which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their
[rights] and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise [them],
the following safeguards [the Mirandawarnings] must be observed."'8 7
Moreover, later in the opinion, the Miranda Court reiterated: "The
warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our
opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statements made by a defendant."88
A decade after Tucker was decided, first in New York v. Quarles89
and then in Oregon v. Elstad,90 the Court reiterated Tucker's way of
looking at, and thinking about, Miranda. In both Quarles and Elstad
the Court underscored the distinction between actual coercion by
physical violence or threats of violence and inherent or irrebuttably
presumed coercion (the basis for the Miranda rules) and between
statements that are actually "coerced" or "compelled" and those obtained merely in violation of Miranda's "procedural safeguards" or
"prophylactic rules."
But is it not proper for the Court to assure that any confession is
not actually compelled in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination by establishing conclusive presumptions and related forms of
prophylactic rules to "implement" or to "reinforce" constitutional
protections - in order to guard against actual constitutional
violations?
No, maintains Joseph Grano; Miranda, as the Court now characterizes what it did in that case, is an "illegitimate" decision. 9 ' "To
permit federal courts to impose prophylactic rules [rules that may be
violated without violating the Constitution] on the states," he contends, is "to say in essence that federal courts have supervisory power
over state courts." 92 According to Grano, the Court lacks constitutional authority to overturn state convictions when the Constitution
has not actually been violated.
86. 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
89. 467 U.s. 649 (1984).
90. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
91. See JOSEPH D. GRANo, CoNiEssioNs, TRuTH, AND TH LAW 174, 185-98 (1993) (drawing upon and elaborating arguments he has made in a number of earlier articles).
92. Id. at 191.
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Stephen Schulhofer and David Strauss strongly disagree. "A conclusive presumption of compulsion," maintains Schulhofer, "is in fact
a responsible reaction to the problems of the voluntariness test, to the
rarity of cases in which compelling pressures are truly absent, and to
the adjudicatory costs of case-by-case decisions in this area." 93
Supporting Schulhofer, Professor Strauss maintains that prophylactic rules are "a central and necessary feature of constitutional
law." 94 "Under any plausible approach to constitutional interpretation," continues Strauss, "the courts must be authorized - indeed,
required - to consider their own and the other branches' limitations
and propensities when they construct doctrines to govern future
cases." 95 According to Strauss, "it makes much more sense to read
into the Constitution a general requirement that its various provisions
be interpreted in light of institutional realities than to insist that these
realities be ignored." 96
I agree with Professors Schulhofer and Strauss that it is not inherently improper for a court to use conclusive presumptions or other
kinds of prophylactic rules. I agree, too, that such rules are a pervasive
form of constitutional decision making.
Suppose Miranda had established a rebuttable presumption that
any incriminating statement obtained in a custodial setting in the absence of Miranda safeguards (or equally effective procedures) is compelled, but that this presumption could be overcome if the suspect
were a police officer, lawyer or law student. Such a presumption
would produce the same result a conclusive presumption would in at
least 95 percent of the cases. But so far as I know everybody agrees
that a court's responsibility to achieve accurate fact finding permits it
to assign burdens of proof and to adopt rebuttable presumptions. As
Professor Strauss argues, if it is legitimate for a court to decide that
evidence of voluntariness is legally immaterial in some cases (where
the evidence is insufficient to overcome a rebuttable presumption),
why should it be - how can it be - improper for a court to extend
that approach to all cases?'
Miranda is based on the realization that case-by-case determination and review of the "voluntariness" of a confession, in light of the
93.
94.
(1988).
95.
96.
97.

Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 435, 453 (1987).
David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Cmi. L. lEv. 190, 190
Id. at 208.
Id.
See id. at 194.
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totality of the circumstances, was severely testing the capacity of the
judiciary and that institutional realities warranted a conclusive presumption that a confession obtained under certain conditions and in
the absence of certain safeguards was compelled. As Schulhofer and
Strauss maintain, under any plausible approach to constitutional interpretation, the courts must be allowed to take into account their factfinding limitations.
Another word about "prophylactic rules." Two years ago, in
Withrow v. Williams,98 it is worth recalling, the Court rejected the government's argument that since Miranda'ssafeguards "are not constitutional in character, but merely 'prophylactic,"' federal habeas review
should not extend to claims based on violations of these safeguards. 99
The Court, per Souter, J., accepted the government's characterization
of the Miranda safeguards, for purposes of the case, but not its
conclusion.
As I read the opinion of the Court in Withrow, it said in effect:
Yes, we have sometimes called the Mirandarules "prophylactic" (because, explained the Court, violation of these rules might lead to exclusion of a confession "that we would not condemn as 'involuntary in
traditional terms'" 00 ), but so what? The Court went on to say that
"'[p]rophylactic' though it may be,... Miranda safeguards 'a fundamental trial right"' - "[b]y bracing against 'the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation,' ...

[it]

serves to guard against 'the use of unreliable statements at trial.""'0
A final word about establishing conclusive presumptions and
promulgating other kinds of prophylactic rules. If, as has been
charged, the Warren Court exceeded its constitutional authority in Miranda, then so did the Burger Court (in Edwards) and the Rehnquist
Court (in Roberson and Minnick).
Edwards held, in effect, that when a custodial suspect invokes his
right to counsel, thereby expressing his belief that he is incapable of
undergoing police questioning without legal assistance, there is a conclusive presumption that any subsequent waiver of rights that comes at
police instigation, not at the suspect's own behest, is compelled.' 2 In
98. 113 S.Ct. 1745 (1993).
99. Id. at 1752.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1753 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)) (emphasis added).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
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Roberson, which reaffirmed and extended the Edwards rule,"°3 the
Court spoke approvingly of "the bright-line, prophylactic Edwards
rule,"'10 4 pointing out that "[w]e have repeatedly emphasized the virtues of a bright-line
rule in cases following Edwards as well as
05
Miranda."
Minnick made the Edwards rule more formidable still. 10 6 In the
course of his majority opinion in Minnick, Justice Kennedy made a
comment about the Edwards rule that applies to Miranda as well:
The rule ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pressures. Edwards conserves judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in making
difficult determinations of voluntariness... ..
Dissenting in Minnick, Justice Scalia (joined by the Chief Justice)
protested that the Court's ruling "is the latest stage of prophylaxis
built on prophylaxis."' 08 As Justice Scalia described the Miranda-Edwards line of cases: Minnick was a prophylactic rule needed to protect
Edwards which was a prophylactic rule needed to protect Miranda
which was a prophylactic rule "needed to protect the right against
compelled self-incriminationfound (at last!) in the Constitution."'1 9
Even though Justice Scalia left no doubt that he was unhappy
about the Court building prophylaxis upon prophylaxis, I think his description of what the Court did in Edwards, Roberson and Minnick is
accurate. If the Warren Court went wrong in Mirandaby establishing
"prophylactic rules," the Courts which succeeded it have been repeat
offenders.
Why the Initial Hostility to Miranda Has Dissipated
Overruling Miranda seems to be an idea whose time has come
and gone. Why is this?
A major reason Miranda evoked much anger and caused much
concern atfirstis that many feared - as the Miranda dissenters led us
to believe - that the landmark decision would strike law enforcement
a grievous blow. Few press accounts of the case failed to quote from
Justice White's bitter dissent, in the course of which he asserted that
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See supra text accompanying note 69.
Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682.
Id. at 681.
See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
498 U.S. at 151.
Id. at 166 (Scalia, 3., dissenting).
Id.
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"[t]he rule announced today will measurably weaken the ability of the
criminal law to perform [its] tasks" and result in "a good many criminal defendants... either not [being] tried at all or [being] acquitted if
the State's evidence, minus the confession, is put to the test of
litigation." 110
Moreover, by giving Miranda limited retroactive effect, by applying the new doctrine to all cases tried after the date of the decision even though the police interrogation had taken place and the confessions had been obtained before Miranda had been decided"' - the
Court "gave the impression that Miranda had affected police interrogation far more than it actually had. 11 2 In the weeks immediately
following Miranda, a number of self-confessed killers walked free.
Although these cases were widely publicized," 3 "[w]hat was... rarely
made clear to the public was that [the] confessions [being tossed] out
were only a relatively tiny, special4 group that were reached retroactively by the Miranda decision.""
By the early 1970s, "the view that Miranda posed no barrier to
effective law enforcement had become widely accepted, not only by
academics but also [by] prominent law officials." 1 5 More recently, a
special committee of the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice
Section reached the same conclusion. It reported that "[a] very strong
majority of those surveyed - prosecutors, judges, and police officers
agree that compliance with Miranda does not present serious
problems for law enforcement."" 6 Still more recently, the Court, per
Souter, J., observed:
110. Miranda,384 U.S. at 542 (white, J., joined by Harlan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting). Justice Harlan (joined by Stewart and White, JJ.,) and Justice Clark also wrote separate dissents.
111. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
112. GAmHAm, supra note 5, at 184.
113. See GA.HA.i, supra note 5, at 184-85.
114. GRAHAM, supra note 5, at 185. A year later, when the Court applied the right to counsel to lineups and other pretrial identifications, it did not make the same mistake. It held that
the new ruling would apply only to identifications conducted in the absence of counsel after the
date of the Wade decision. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

115. Schulhofer, supra note 93, at 456. See also OTis H. STEmEs, THE SUPREME COURT
AND CoNrrssioNs OF GUiLT 168-200 (1973); Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to
Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1, 17-20 (1986). But see Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning
Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417, 1464-66 (1985). For a summary and evaluation of many of the
empirical studies, see MODEL CODE OF PRE-AR
1, 1968); STEPHENS, supra.

ONrNrEN PROCEDURE 101-49 (study draft no.

116. Special Comm.on Crim. Justice in a Free Soc'y, CriminalJustice in Crisis, ABA Ctmi.
JUST. SEC. 27, 28 (1988). However, as the article was going to press I learned that Professor Paul
Cassell had written an article maintaining that despite the "conventional academic wisdom" to
the contrary, Miranda had "significantly harmed law enforcement efforts." See Paul G. Cassell,
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[In the 27 years since Miranda was decided] law enforcement has
grown inconstitutional as well as technological sophistication, and
there is little reason to believe that the police today are unable,
117 or
even generally unwilling, to satisfy Miranda'srequirements.
The initial hostility to Miranda has faded away for another reason. In its early years, the case generated a considerable amount of
confusion and uncertainty.
For example, did it extend to questioning
"on the street"? 118 Did it apply to a person interviewed in his own
home by an IRS agent?"1 9 Two years after Miranda, Judge Friendly
voiced concern that "the Court may be moving toward a position that
compulsion exists whenever an officer makes an inquiry, so that warnings must always be given."' 0
A quarter-century after Miranda, however, much of the uncertainty it once generated has largely been dispelled. It is now fairly
clear that absent special circumstances (such as arresting a suspect at
gunpoint or forcibly subduing him) police questioning "on the street"
or in a person's home or office is not "custodial." Nor is "roadside
questioning" of a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop. As a
general matter, the Miranda doctrine has been limited, as Judge
Friendly hoped it would be, to the police station or an equivalent
setting. 2 '
Some of Miranda'sharshest critics make no secret of the fact that
they are determined to topple the decision because of its "symbolic
status as the epitome of Warren Court activism in the criminal law
area."'122 The Miranda case is a symbol. But which way does that cut?
As Stephen Schulhofer has pointed out, symbols are important,
especially "the symbolic effects of criminal procedural guarantees,"
for they "underscore our societal commitment to restraint in an area
Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw.U. L. REv. (1995) (forthcoming). I also learned that Professor Stephen Schulhofer was writing a response to Professor Cassell, sharply challenging Cassell's calculations. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical
EffecL" Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv.

-

(1995)

(forthcoming).
117. Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1755 (1993).
118. See A. Kenneth Pye, Interrogationof CriminalDefendants - Some Views on Miranda v.
Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 199,219 (1966). See also Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure,the
Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1320, 1383 (1977).
119. See Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. Ci. L. REv. 671, 676 n.25 (1968).
120. lIdat 713 (emphasis added).
121. See generally, 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§§ 6.6(e)-(f) (1984 & Supp. 1991). See also supra text accompanying note 56.
122. OFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUsTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SH.
RiEs, REPORT No.1, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION 526 (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 437, 565 (1989).
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in which emotions easily run uncontrolled.' 23 Even Gerald Caplan,
one of Miranda's strongest critics, recognizes that the case may be
seen as "a gesture of government's willingness to treat the lowliest
antagonist as worthy of respect and consideration."' 24
Should the "Fruits"of Miranda Violations Be Admissible?
Although it is highly unlikely that Miranda will be overruled, the
Relnquist Court may yet strike Miranda a heavy blow - by ruling
that all the clues and physical evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation are admissible. The Court has not quite said this yet,
but it came close to doing so in Oregon v. Elstad. 25 In that case, in
the course of ruling that the fact that the police had earlier obtained a
statement from the defendant in violation of his Miranda rights did
not bar the use of a second confession obtained when the police did
comply with Miranda,the Court indicated that the "fruits" of Miranda
violations should be admissible whether
they are a second confession,
26
a witness or "an article of evidence.'
Nietzche once observed that the commonest stupidity consists in
forgetting what one is trying to do.' 27 What was the Miranda Court
trying to do? It was trying to take away the police's incentive to exploit a suspect's anxiety and confusion by implying that they have a
right to an answer and that it will be worse for the suspect if she does
not."2 How could we expect the police to comply with Mirandaif we
123. Schulhofer, supra note 93, at 460; see also Tracey Maclin, Seeing the Constitution from
the Backseatof a PoliceSquad Car,70 B.U. L. Rv. 543,588-89 (1990); White, supranote 115, at
21-22.

124. Caplan, supra note 115, at 1471; see also LivA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRWME, LAW AND
Potrrics 407 (1983).

125. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
126. Id. at 308. As to whether, in considering the admissibility of evidence derived from
wrongfully obtained confessions, a bright line should be drawn between Mirandaviolations and
coerced or "involuntary" confessions, compare Akhil R. Amar & Rende B. Lettow, Fifth
Amendment FirstPrinciples: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MiCH. L. REv. 857 (1995) with
Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits"of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REv. 929 (1995).
127. See LON J. FuLLER, TmE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 41 (1940).

128. The Miranda Court was also trying to provide the police with clear guidelines about
lawful interrogation procedures and to reduce the judicial burden of making time-consuming
and frequently unreliable determinations about the "voluntariness" of challenged confessions.
See David H. Wollin, Policingthe Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?,53 Omo ST.
L.J. 805,841-43 (1992); The Supreme Court,1984 Term -

Leading Cases, 99 HARv. L. REv. 120,

145-47 (1985). These objectives, too, would seem to require barring the use of the physical fruits
of Miranda violations.
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were to prohibit only confessions obtained in violation of that doctrine, but allow the use of everything these confessions brought to
light? 129

As one commentator recently noted: "Expert interrogators have
long recognized, and continue to instruct, that a confession is a primary source for determining the existence and whereabouts of the
fruits of a crime such as documents or weapons."' 30
THE LINEUP CASES: THE WARREN COURT DECISIONS THAT
SUFFERED THE CRUELEST

FATE

Unlike the Warren Court's most publicized criminal procedure
rulings, Mapp and Miranda, the lineup cases were explicitly designed
to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction. Ironically, these
were the Warren Court decisions that suffered the worst treatment at
the hands of the Burger Court.
Although mistaken identification has probably been the single
greatest cause of conviction of the innocent, 13 surprisingly the
Supreme Court did not come to grips with this problem until the closing years of the Warren tenure. Then the Court seemed to make up
for lost time. In a 1967 trilogy of cases, United States v. Wade, Gilbert
v. California, and Stovall v. Denno,'132 the Court leapfrogged case-bycase analysis of various pretrial identification situations and applied
the right to counsel to identification in one dramatic move. "Since it
appears that there is grave potential for prejudice in the pretrial
lineup, which [absent counsel's presence] may not be capable of reconstruction at trial," the Court deemed counsel's presence essential
1 33
to "avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial.'
129. See Elstad,470 U.S. at 356-59 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). See also
Robert M. Pitler, "The Fruitof the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized,56 CAL. L. REV.
579, 611-20 (1968). Cf.Yale Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and ContemporaneousIncriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of CriminalProcedure, 1961 U. ILL L.F. 78,

96-97.
130. Wollin, supranote 128, at 845 (quoting CHARLEs E. O'HARA & GREGORY L. O'HARA,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 119 (1988)). See also Elstad, 470 U.S. at 357 &

n.39 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
131. See Joseph D. Grano, Kirby, Biggers & Ash: Do Any ConstitutionalSafeguards Remain
Against the Dangers of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MicH. L. REV. 719, 723-24 (1974) and authorities discussed therein. See also Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Questfor PenalJustice: The
Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. IL. L.F. 518, 541-42.

132. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
133. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236.
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Although the pretrial identification in Wade and Gilbertoccurred
after the defendants had been indicted, nothing in the Court's reasoning suggested that an identification that takes place before a defendant is formally charged is less riddled with dangers or less difficult for
a suspect to reconstruct without the presence of counsel than one occurring after that point. Nevertheless, in Kirby v. Illinois"M the Burger Court announced a "post-indictment" rule, one that enables law
enforcement officials to avoid the impact of the Wade-Gilbert rule by
conducting identification procedures before formal charges are filed.
Nor is that all. A year after Kirby, the Burger Court struck the
Wade-Gilbertrule another heavy blow. Although the defendant made
a forceful argument that the availability of the photographs at trial
furnished no protection against the suggestive manner in which they
may have been originally shown to the witness or the comments or
gestures that may have accompanied the display, the Court held in
United States v. Ash' 35 that the Wade-Gilbert right to counsel did not
apply to a pretrial photo-identification procedure - even though the
procedure was conducted after the suspect had been indicted and
even though the suspect could have appeared in person at a lineup.
Taken together, Kirby and Ash virtually demolished the original
lineup decisions. Nevertheless, in theory abuses in photographic displays and in preindictment lineups are not beyond the reach of the
Constitution. A defendant may still convince a court that the circumstances surrounding his identification present so "substantial [a] likelihood of irreparable misidentification" as to violate due process. 36
But the Burger Court made this quite difficult to achieve.
Although it ought to suffice, an "unnecessarily suggest[ive]" identification is not enough - the "totality of circumstances" may still
permit the use of identification evidence if, despite the unnecessary
"suggestive[ness]," "the out-of-court identification possesses certain
features of reliability." 37 This is an elusive, unpredictable case-bycase test that, as might be expected, has not turned out to be any more

134. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
135. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
136. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-201 (1972); see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98, 110-14, 117 (1977).
137. Manson, 432 U.S. at 110 (1977).
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manageable for the courts or any more illuminating for law enforcement officers than the
pre-Miranda "totality of the circumstances""voluntariness" test.138
The Burger Court's decisions concerning pretrial identification
may well be the saddest chapter in modem American criminal procedure. The Burger Court was "far more impressed than its predecessor
with the importance of the defendant's guilt,' 139 but its harsh treatment of the 1967 lineup cases indicates its willingness to subordinate
even the reliability of the guilt-determining process to the demands
for speed and finality.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THE POST-WARREN ERA: A PROLONGED
CAMPAIGN OF "GUERILLA WARFARE"

When the Burger Court handed down the Kirby and Ash decisions it demonstrated how quickly and effectively it could cripple a
disfavored Warren Court precedent without flatly overruling it, but
this development constituted an exception to the Burger Court's general approach in criminal procedure. In the main, in place of the
counterrevolution in criminal procedure that many expected, "the
Burger Court waged a prolonged and rather bloody campaign of guerrilla warfare."' 40 This observation applies with special force to the law
of search and seizure.
There are two principal ways to reduce the impact of Mapp v.
Ohio: (a) by narrowing the thrust of the exclusionary rule, i.e., by
restricting the circumstances in which evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded, and (b) by shrinking the
scope of the amendment itself (e.g., diluting what amounts to "probable cause," making it easy for the police to establish "consent" to
what would otherwise be an illegal search, and taking a grudging view
of what constitutes a "search" or "seizure"), thereby giving the police
more leeway to investigate crime and the defense fewer opportunities
to invoke the exclusionary rule. On a few occasions the post-Miranda.
138. See Stephen P. Grossman, Suggestive Identifications: The Due Process Test Fails to Meet
Its Own Criteria,11 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 59-60; 96-97 (1981); Randolph A. Jonakait, Reliable
Identification: Could the Supreme Court Tell in Manson v. Brathwaite?, 52 U. CoLo. L. REv.
511, 515 (1981); Wallace W. Sherwood, The Erosion of ConstitutionalSafeguards in the Area of
Eyewitness Identification, 30 How. L.J 731, 770 (1987).
139. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEms 4 (2d ed. 1986). See also Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Consti-

tution and the Police: IndividualRights and Law Enforcement, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 18 (1988).
140. Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1436, 1442 (1987).
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Court did decide some search and seizure cases in favor of the defense, 14 1 but in the main it substantially reduced the impact of the
exclusionary rule both by cutting back on the application of the rule
itself and by down-sizing the scope of the protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
The "Deterrence" Rationale Comes to the Fore
For much of its life the "federal" or "Fourth Amendment" exclusionary rule, first promulgated in the famous 1914 case of Weeks v.
United States, 42 rested not on the empiricalproposition that it actually
deterred illegal searches, but on what might be called a "principled
basis." That principle was to avoid "sanctioning" or "ratifying" the
police lawlessness that produced the proffered evidence, to keep the
judicial process from being contaminated by partnership in police misconduct and, ultimately, to remind the police and assure the public
that the Court took constitutional rights seriously. 43 That view what might be called the "original understanding" of the exclusionary
rule - is the dominant theme of Mapp v. Ohio."4
But in the post-Warren Court Era, ways of thinking about the
exclusionary rule changed. The "deterrence" rationale, and its concomitant "interest balancing," bloomed. Thus, whether the exclusionary rule should be applied was said to present a question "not of rights
but of remedies" - a question to be answered by weighing the "likely
'costs' of the rule against its "likely 'benefits.""' 45 By "deconstitutionalizing" the rule - by shifting the nature of the debate from arguments about constitutional law and judicial integrity to arguments
141. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975) (holding that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint on a suspect's liberty); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601-03 (1980)
(holding that the police must be armed with a warrant before entering a suspect's home to make
a routine arrest); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,11 (1985) (holding that the police slaying of an
unarmed, nondangerous felon to prevent his escape constitutes an "unreasonable seizure" within
the meaning of Fourth Amendment).
142. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
143. See the discussion of Weeks and other early search-and-seizure cases in Yale Kamisar,
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "PrincipledBasis" Ratherthan an "Empiri-

cal Proposition"?,16 CREIGHTON L. Rav. 565, 598-604 (1983). See also Schulhofer, supra note
139, at 23-24.
144. See Kamisar, supra note 143, at 621-27.
145. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 349, 354 (1974). Calandra,the most important exclusionary rule case of the 1970s, is extensively discussed and strongly criticized in
Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule As a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. Rnv. 251 (1974).
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about "deterrence" and empirical data -146 the critics of the exclusionary rule won some important victories.
This is hardly surprising. The "costs" of the exclusionary rule are
immediately apparent - the "freeing" of a "plainly guilty" drug
dealer - but the "benefits" of the rule are much less concrete. As
Professor Schulhofer has observed:
[The benefits of the exclusionary rule] involve safeguarding a zone
of dignity and privacy for every citizen, controlling abuses of power,
preserving checks and balances. One could view these as pretty
weighty benefits, perhaps even invaluable
47 ones. But the Court has
viewed them as abstract, speculative.'
It is difficult to read the post-Warren Court's search and seizure
cases without coming away with the feeling that it did its "balancing"
in an empirical fog and that its cost-benefit analysis - although it
sounds objective, even scientific - simply gave back the values and
assumptions the Court fed into it. Thus, if one takes the position that
"no empirical researcher ...has yet been able to establish with any
assurance whether the [exclusionary] rule has a deterrent effect even
in the situations in which it is now applied," 48 as the post-Warren
Court does, and one characterizes the rule's social costs as "substantial," "well known" and "long-recognized,"' 49 as the post-Warren
Court also did, 5 ° the outcome is quite predictable.
146. See Calandra,414 U.S. 338, 348-52 (1974) (holding that a grand jury witness may not
refuse to answer questions on ground that they are based on fruits of an unlawful search); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (greatly limiting a state prisoner's ability to obtain federal
habeas corpus relief on search-and-seizure grounds); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,453-54,
459-60 (1976) (explaining that the rule's deterrent purpose would not be furthered by barring
evidence obtained illegally by state police from federal civil tax proceedings). An even more
important victory was won a decade later in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)
(adopting a "reasonable, good faith" modification of the exclusionary rule, at least in search
warrant cases).
147. Schulhofer, supra note 139, at 19.
148. Janis, 428 U.S. at 452 n.22, quoted in Leon, 468 U.S. at 918. See also Stone, 428 U.S. at
492 & n.32.
149. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907; Stone, 428 U.S. at 490-91.
150. I think it fair to say that the "costs" of the exclusionary rule are "much lower... than is
commonly assumed." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEizuRE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 22 (2nd ed. 1987). According to probably the most comprehensive study
of the available empirical data, the evidence "consistently indicates that the general level of the
rule's effects on criminal prosecutions is marginal at most." Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at
What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ
Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 611, 622. See also
CHARLES H. WHrrEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOoIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS
OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 45-46 (3rd ed. 1993); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and
its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure,23 U.
MH. J.L. REF. 591, 625, 634 (1990); Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary
Rule: An EmpiricalAssessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 606; Craig D. Uchida &
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Yet is not all the talk about the "substantial costs of the exclusionary rule" misleading? Is it not the Fourth Amendment itself, rather
than the exclusionary rule, that imposes these costs? The "substantial
costs" said to be exacted by the exclusionary rule would also be exacted by any other means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment that
worked. A society whose police obey the Fourth Amendment in the
first place "pays the same price" as the society whose police cannot
use the evidence they obtained because they violated the Fourth
Amendment: both societies convict fewer criminals.
If a society relies on the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth
Amendment, some "guilty" defendants will not be convicted. If a society relies on a viable alternative means of enforcing the Fourth
Amendment, however (and critics of the exclusionary rule have often
assured us that the alternatives they have in mind would be at least
equally effective), then "guilty" defendants will not be set free - but
only because they will not be searched unlawfully in the first place. 51
The only time the Fourth Amendment would not impose the "substantial societal costs" critics of the exclusionary rule complain about
would be if the Amendment were converted into "an unenforced
1' 52
honor code that the police [could] follow in their discretion.'
The Leon Case: The Court Adopts a So-Called "Good Faith"
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
The "deterrence" rationale and its concomitant "cost-benefit" or
"balancing approach" to the exclusionary rule reached a high point in
United States v. Leon, 53 the case that adopted a so-called "good faith"
(actually a "reasonable mistake") exception to the exclusionary rule.
In Leon the Court held that what it called the "marginal or nonexistent" benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable but mistaken reliance on a subsequently invalidated
search warrant "cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion."' 5 4
Although Leon may appear to be little more than a routine application of the "cost-benefit" approach utilized in earlier cases, it is not.
Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress and "Lost Cases:" The Effects of the
Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions,81 J. Cum. L. & CRMINoLoOGY 1034, 1064-66 (1991).
151. See Laurence H. Tribe, ConstitutionalCalculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?,
98 HAv. L. REv. 592, 609 (1985).
152. Leon, 468 U.S. at 978 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
154. Id. at 922.
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The earlier cases' 5 5 were based on the assumption that the exclusionary rule - fully applicable in a criminal prosecution against the direct
victim of a Fourth Amendment violation - need not also be applied
in certain "collateral" or "peripheral" contexts because "no significant
additionalincrement of deterrence [was] deemed likely. ' 156
Leon was a search warrant case and there is a good deal to be
said for confining the "good faith" exception to the warrant setting. 5 7
Still, the case must be read in light of the Burger Court's general hostility to the exclusionary rule, and the Court's doubts that "the extreme sanction of exclusion," as the Court called it in Leon,15 8 can
"pay its way" in any setting, let alone a setting where the Fourth
Amendment violations are neither deliberate nor "substantial." In
the future, I fear, the Rehnquist Court may say that the same costbalancing that led to the admissibility of the evidence in Leon supports a "good faith" exception across the board. It is hard to believe
that the Court adopted such an exception in Leon only to limit it to
the tiny percentage of police searches conducted pursuant to warrants.
The Leon decision is especially hard to defend in light of a decision the Court rendered only a year earlier, Illinois v. Gates,'5 9 which
dismantled the existing probable cause structure in favor of a mushy
"totality of the circumstances" test. The Gates Court made it fairly
clear that "probable cause" is something less than "more-probablethan-not" (although how much less is anything but clear). At one
point, the Gates Court told us that "probable cause requires only a
probability or substantialchance of criminal activity. )160

155. See cases summarized supra note 146.
156. LAFAVE, supra note 150, at 50-51.
157. See Wayne R. LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": United States v. Leon, Its
Rationale and Ramifications,1984 U. ILL.L. REv. 895, 927-29. See also LAFAvE, supra note 150,
at 77-80.

158. See 468 U.S. at 926.
159. 462 U.S. 213 (1983), extensively discussed in Yale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause,"
"Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IowA L. REv. 551 (1984); Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment
Vagaries (of Improbable Cause Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing
Askew), 74 J. CriM.L. & CIMVINOLOGY 1171, 1187-89 (1983); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRim. L. REv. 257, 274-75, 329-40 (1984). But see
Joseph D. Grano, ProbableCauseand Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics oflllinois v. Gates,
17 Mic. J.L. REF. 465 (1984).
160. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244, n.13 (emphasis added).
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What is a "Search" or "Seizure"? The Court Takes a Grudging
View
"Probable cause" is the heart of the Fourth Amendment. But
diluting the standard of probable cause is only one way that the postWarren Court has reduced the protection against unreasonable search
and seizure. "Search" and "seizure" are key words - and key concepts. For police practices need not be based on individualized suspicion or conducted pursuant to search warrants - indeed, are not
regulated by the Fourth Amendment at all - unless they are classified as "searches" or "seizures." Thus another way to diminish the
security against unreasonable search and seizure is to take a narrow,
stingy view of what amounts to a "search" or "seizure." The Burger
and Reinquist Courts have done just that.
Thus, because, according to the Court, a depositor who reveals
her affairs to a bank "takes the risk" that this information will be conveyed to the government, she has no legitimate expectation of privacy
as to the checks and deposit slips she exposes to bank employees in
the ordinary course of business.16 ' Similarly, because, we are told,
one who uses the phone "assumes the risk" that the telephone company will reveal to the police the numbers he dialed, the government's
use of a pen register (a device that records all numbers dialed from a
given phone and the time they were dialed, but does not overhear oral
communications) is not a search or seizure either.' 62 Thus, so far as
the Fourth Amendment is concerned, the police need neither a warrant nor probable cause nor, presumably, any cause, to use such a
device.
Asks Tracey Maclin:
Does the Court really believe that we have no sense of privacy in
the telephone numbers we dial from our homes or in the financial
records we deposit in the bank?... How would you feel if, during
your drive to work, the radio station began broadcasting the telephone numbers you had dialed over the last month? Or if, while
reading the morning newspaper, you 1saw
63 copies of all the checks
you had written during the past year?

161. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).
162. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
163. Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshalk Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77
CORNELL L. Rnv. 723, 740 (1992).
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What makes the "assumption of risk" in these cases voluntary? If
you want to participate in modem American life at all, do you not
have to assume these risks?1' 4
Although one takes sufficient precautions (e.g., erects a fence and
posts warning signs) to render entry on his private land a criminal
trespass under state law, police entry on and examination of that land
is beyond the curtilage and, thus, unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. 65 Moreover, even land admittedly within the curtilage (for example, a fenced-in backyard) may not come within the protection of
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the Court informed a marijuana-growing defendant that the Constitution failed to protect him against police aerial surveillance because, even though he had completely
enclosed his backyard with two high fences, he had "knowingly exposed" it to the public.' 66 Evidently he should have placed an opaque
dome over his backyard.
An examination of a person's trash bags can reveal intimate details about his business dealings, political activities and associations,
consumption of alcohol, and sexual practices. (Archaeologists tell us
that if we want to find out what is really going on in a community, we
should look at its garbage.) Nevertheless, the Rehnquist Court held
that the police may rip open the sealed opaque trash bags one leaves
at the curb for garbage pick-up and rummage through their contents
for evidence of crime without engaging in a "search."'1 67 Thus, this
police investigatory technique, too, is completely uncontrolled by the
Constitution.
The Rehnquist Court has also given the crucial term "seizure" a
narrow reading. Recently, for example, the Court told us that if
armed police board an interstate bus at a scheduled intermediate stop,
announce their mission is to detect drug traffickers, randomly approach a passenger, ask to see his bus ticket and driver's license, and
then ask permission to search his luggage - a police practice that
some lower courts "have compared to the tactics employed by fascist
164. See Schulhofer, supra note 139, at 25-26.
165. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (expansively reading the "open fields" exception to Fourth Amendment restraints). For strong criticism of this case, see Steven A.
Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (as Illustrated by the
Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 1 (1986).
166. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,211-14 (1986). See also Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227,239 (1986). For criticism of these cases see Wayne R. LaFave, The Forgotten
Motto of Obsta Principiisin Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence,28 ARiz. L. REv. 291 (1986).
167. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). See also United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d
927 (1st Cir. 1992) (extending Greenwood to apply even when an individual shreds his papers
before putting them in the garbage, but IRS agents painstakingly reassemble them).
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and totalitarian regimes of a bygone era"' 68 - no "seizure" takes
place. Under these circumstances, the Court has told us a reasonable
person would feel free to terminate the encounter or to ignore the
police presence and go about his or her business. 6 9 In other words,
we are supposed to believe that with a police officer towering over
him and at least partially blocking the narrow bus aisle, a reasonable
bus passenger would feel free to just say no. We are supposed to believe that with a police officer "in his face," a reasonable passenger
would feel free to tell the officer that he wanted to finish reading a
Sports Illustrated article or return to the crossword puzzle he was
working on - or just go to sleep.
What Constitutes a "Consent" to an Otherwise Illegal Search or
Seizure? The Court Takes a Relaxed View
Although the post-Warren Courts have taken a grudging view of
what constitutes a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, they have taken a relaxed view of what constitutes a consent to an otherwise illegal search or seizure. "Consent" is
law enforcement's trump card. It is the easiest and most propitious
way for the police to avoid the problems presented by the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, the protection afforded by the Amendment will
vary greatly depending on how difficult or easy it is for the police to
establish consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte170 made establishing
consent all too easy.
If an officer lacks authority to conduct a search, he may request
permission to search, but he cannot demand it. To many people who
confront the police, however, this distinction is very thin - or nonexistent. "[W]hat on their face are merely words of request take on
color from the officer's uniform, badge, gun and demeanor. "171
168. Maclin, supra note 163, at 800.
169. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). See also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 629 (1991) (ruling that a police show of authority directed at a particular individual, such as
police pursuit on foot or calling on individual to halt, does not constitute a "seizure" of person
unless and until individual submits to authority or is physically restrained by police). For criticism of Bostick and Hodari and a discussion of earlier cases involving what might be called
"close encounters of the non-Fourth Amendment kind," such as United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980) (confronting a suspected drug courier at an airport); see Wayne R. LaFave,
Pinguitudinous Police, PachydermatousPrey: Whence FourthAmendment "Seizures"?, 1991 U.
IL.. L. REv. 729; Maclin, supra note 163, at 745-52, 800-12.
170. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
171. Caleb Foote, The FourthAmendment: Obstacle or Necessity in The Law of Arrest?, in
PoUcE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 29, 30 (Claude R. Sowle ed. 1962).
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All the police have to do to make the distinction between "request" and "demand" meaningful is to advise a person that he has a
right to refuse an officer's "request" and that such a refusal will be
respected. But the Schneckloth Court dismissed such a requirement
as "thoroughly impractical."''
That such a warning would undermine
need for [consent] searches"173
legitimate
"the
called
what the Court
is quite clear; that such a warning would be "impractical" (as that
word is normally defined) is not at all clear.
After Schneckloth, a person may effectively consent to a search
even though he was never informed - and the government has failed
to demonstrate that he was ever aware - that he had the right to
refuse the officer's "request" to search his person, automobile or
home. After Schneckloth, the criminal justice system, in one important respect at least, can (to borrow a phrase from Escobedo) "depend
for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights."' 174
More recently, in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 75 the Rehnquist Court
held that a warrantless entry of one's home is valid when the police
reasonably, but mistakenly, believe that a third party (in this case, a
girlfriend who had in fact moved out of the apartment) possesses common authority over the premises. Thus, even though (a) no magistrate has authorized the search, (b) no probable cause supports the
search and (c) no exigency requires prompt action, the police may invade a person's home on the basis of the "seeming consent" of a third
party.
The Rodriguez dissenters forcefully argued that when confronted
with the choice of relying on the consent of a third party or obtaining
a warrant, the police "should secure a warrant and must therefore accept the risk of error should they instead choose to rely on consent."'1 76 But the majority was not impressed: "What [a person] is
assured by the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that no government
search of his house will occur unless he consents; but that no such
172.
173.
174.
175.

412 U.S. at 231.
Id. at 227.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
497 U.S. 177 (1990). For extensive criticism of this case see Thomas Y. Davies, Denying

a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes

Fourth Amendment Reasonableness,and Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error,59 TENN.
L. REV. 1 (1991). See also Maclin, supra note 163, at 796-99.
176. 497 U.S. at 193 (Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
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search will occur that is 'unreasonable' 1' 7 7 - and a search is not unreasonable when the police "reasonably (though erroneously) believe
that the person who has consented to their entry is a resident of the
premises.' 78
Is THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE THE ENEMY OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT?

A critic of the exclusionary rule might take all the search and
seizure cases I have discussed (as well as others I have not) and throw
them back at me. All that I have demonstrated, the critic might say, is
that the exclusionary rule is the enemy of the Fourth Amendment. For
the rule puts tremendous pressure on the courts to avoid "freeing a
guilty defendant" and the courts respond by watering down the rules
governing search and seizure. If the exclusionary rule had not been
imposed on the states, the critic might argue, the Fourth Amendment
would never have been construed as narrowly as it has been.
However, a meaningful tort remedy or any other effective alternative to the exclusionary rule would also put strong pressure on the
courts to water down the rules governing search and seizure. As
Monrad Paulsen pointed out shortly before the Mapp case was
decided:
Whenever the rules are enforced by meaningful sanctions, our attention is drawn to their content. The comfort of Freedom's words
spoken in the abstract is always disturbed by their application to a
contested instance. Any rule of police regulation
enforced in fact
79
will generate pressures to weaken the rule.'
Disparaging the exclusionary rule, Judge (later Justice) Benjamin
Cardozo once said of it: "The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."'8 0 This epigram is the most famous criticism of
the rule and surely the best one-sentence argument ever made against
it. Cardozo made this statement some seven decades ago, but it would
make a snappy ten-second "sound bite" today.
In the post-Warren Court era, however, the criminal has "gone
free" less and less because the exclusionary rule has been greatly narrowed by a "good faith" exception and other restrictions and because,
177.
178.
179.
POWER

497 U.S. at 183.
Id. at 186.
Monrad Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, in PoLICE
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 87, 88 (Claude R. Sowle ed. 1992) (emphasis added).

180. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
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as I have tried to show, the scope of the Fourth Amendment itself has
shrunk quite significantly.
Seven decades ago, when Cardozo delivered his famous one-liner
(and, I am willing to concede, even three decades ago, when the Warren Court imposed the exclusionary rule on the states), the law of
search and seizure probably did unduly restrict the police - on paper.
But Mapp v. Ohio has had a large impact. Whether or not the Warren
Court intended this result or foresaw it, Mapp and its progeny have
brought about a great clarification and simplification of the law of
search and seizure - almost always in favor of the police.
This is probably the price we have had to pay for the exclusionary
rule - or the price we would have had to pay for any remedy that
actually worked. But that price has been paid.
Cardozo's famous epigram is outdated. The time has come to revise it. And as revised that epigram becomes a powerful argument in
favor of the exclusionary rule: Nowadays, the criminal does not "go
free" because the constable has made an honest blunder or a technical
one. The post-Mapp cases have provided the police with so much
room to operate without fear of the exclusionary rule that nowadays
the criminal only "goes free" if and when the constable hasflouted the
Fourth Amendment - if and when he has blundered badly.
THE "SELECTIVE INCORPORATION" DOCTRINE -

AND ITS IMPACT

ON T=E FOURTH AMENDMENT ExcLUsIoNARY RULE

The "total incorporation" doctrine, the view, advocated most notably by Justice Hugo Black,' that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" ali of the guarantees found in the Bill of Rights and
applies them to the states in the same manner that they apply to the
Federal Government, has never commanded a majority." But during
the Warren Court era the "selective incorporation" doctrine came to
the fore, and, as a practical matter, produced the same results the "to83
tal incorporation" doctrine would have brought about.
Under the "selective incorporation" approach, "[o]nce the Court
had determined, upon analysis of the whole of a [Bill of Rights] guarantee, that the guarantee protected a fundamental right, that guarantee 'would be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth
181. See, eg., Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J.,
joined by Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
182. See Jerold H. Israel, Selective IncorporationRevisited, 71 GEo. LJ.253, 258 (1992).
183. See id. at 290-98.
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Amendment according to the same standards that [apply] against federal encroachment. ' '184 In less than a decade, in a series of cases beginning with Mapp, "the Court's conception of what was fundamental
was expanded to include all the significant provisions of the Bill of
Rights."' 8 5
In Malloy v. Hogan,8 6 holding that the privilege against self-incrimination was a fundamental right, and thus safeguarded against
state action under the applicable federal standard of the Fifth Amendment, the Warren Court "undisputably established that selective incorporation had become the majority view."' 18 As Professors LaFave
and Israel have observed:
A series of cases decided during the remainder of the decade reaffirmed the position taken in Malloy. Those cases held applicable to
the states, under the same standards applied to the federal government, the Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial, to a trial by
jury, to confront opposing witnesses, and to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses, and the Fifth Amendment prohibition against
double jeopardy. In each case, the Court relied squarely upon a
selective incorporation analysis. Moreover, in Duncan v. Louisiana,
the Court noted that ...the crucial issue was not whether a particular guarantee was fundamental to every "fair and equitable" criminal justice system "that might be imagined," but whether it was
fundamental "in the context
of the criminal processes maintained by
18 8
the American states."
The fact that the "incorporated" Bill of Rights guarantee applied
to the states to the same extent that it applied to the federal government had an unfortunate side effect - one that Justice John Harlan, a
formidable critic of "selective incorporation," was quick to flag. The
only way to "temper" the "incorporated" Bill of Rights provision in
order to "allow the States more elbow room," Harlan pointed out, was
to dilute the federal guarantee itself.'8 9 Thus the many Supreme
184. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEl.CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 97 (1984).
185. CRAIG M. BRADLEY, TmE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 18

(1993).
186. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).

187. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 184, at 96-97.
188. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supranote 184, at 97. The quotation from Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is fully applicable to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment) appears at 391 U.S. at 149-50, n.14. See also the Court's
summary of the "specifics" of the Bill of Rights that it had "selectively incorporated" by the year
1968 in Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148.
189. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 117 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 117 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Court cases arising from state courts that narrowly and grudgingly interpret the scope of the protection against unreasonable search and
seizure apply to federal, as well as state, prosecutions. Nor is that all.
Although Justice Tom Clark, the author of the Mapp opinion,
presented as many reasons for the exclusionary rule as he could possibly muster, 190 his essential position, as Francis Allen observed at the
time, was that "the exclusionary rule is part of the Fourth Amendment; the Fourth Amendment is part of the Fourteenth; therefore the
exclusionary rule is part of the Fourteenth."' '9 As a result, critics of
Mapp had to direct their fire at the efficacy, validity and constitutional
basis of the "federal" or "Fourth Amendment" exclusionary rule itself, i.e., the long-established rule excluding illegally seized evidence in
federal prosecutions. This they have done did with great force and
considerable success.
At the time of Mapp, the "federal exclusionary rule" seemed
quite secure.' 9 But the "storm of controversy" over Mapp engulfed
the "federal exclusionary rule" as well.' 9 3 Thus, the future of the 1914
federal rule, which had seemed so bright before the Warren's Court's
revolution in criminal procedure got underway, is now rather clouded.
Another word about the exclusionary rule: the reasoning the
post-Warren Court has employed in the search and seizure cases outruns the results that have been reached to date. If, as the Court has
told us, any search and seizure exclusionary rule must "pay its way" by
deterring official misconduct' 94 and if, as it has also told us, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule has never been established (to the
190. See the discussion of the Mapp opinion in Kamisar, supra note 143, at 621-27.
191. Francis A. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 26. See also id. at 23-24.
192. The disagreement in Mapp was only over the applicability of the search and seizure
exclusionary rule to the states; "there is not a word in [Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion] suggesting that the rule is intrinsically bad." TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 20-21 (1969).

193. Concurring in Mapp, Justice Douglas observed that Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), overruled in Mapp, had evoked "a storm of constitutional controversy which only today
finds its end." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 670. But the storm of controversy greatly intensified and embraced the 1914 Weeks rule as well as Mapp.
194. The exclusionary rule "must be carefully limited to the circumstances in which it will
pay its way by deterring official lawlessness." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)
(quoting Justice White's earlier observation, with approval, in his concurring opinion in Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 257-58 (1983) (White, J., concurring)). Because the Leon Court concluded

that the exclusionary rule can have "no substantial deterrent effect" when the police have acted
in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate that is subsequently
found to be invalid, it concluded that the rule "cannot pay its way in those situations." 468 U.S.
at 907-08,.n.6.
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satisfaction of the post-Warren Court at any rate), 195 why stop with
only a narrowing of the exclusionary rule? Why not abolish the rule
altogether?
Fortunately, law is not a syllogism. I very much doubt that the
current Court will carry the way it talks about, and thinks about, the
search and seizure exclusionary rule to its logical conclusion. I believe
rather that a majority of the Justices are prepared to "live with" what
they would probably call a "pruned" exclusionary rule and a "workable" Fourth Amendment (and what I would call a "battered" exclusionary rule and a "shrunken" Fourth Amendment).
The principal danger lies elsewhere. Now that the search and
seizure exclusionary rule rests on an "empirical proposition" rather
than a "principled basis" - now that application of the exclusionary
rule presents a question not of "rights" but of "remedies" - the rule
is almost defenseless against Congressional efforts to repeal it, (most
likely by a statute that would purport to replace the rule with what we
shall be assured is an "effective" tort remedy).
WHY WAS GIDEON WARMLY APPLAUDED,

BuT

MAPP AND

MIRANDA WIDELY CRITICIZED?

So far, I have said nothing about the famous Gideon case, 196 the
only Warren Court criminal procedure decision in favor of the defense
that was greeted by widespread applause. What accounts for Gideon's
popularity?
An untrained, unrepresented, and often uneducated person trying to defend himself as best he can in a public courtroom makes a
highly visible and most disconcerting spectacle. But few of us have
ever seen or thought much about the plight of an individual who is
being searched illegally in a poor neighborhood or "grilled" vigorously in the backroom of a police station.
Many of the people who accepted the Gideon principle "in principle" soon qualified their support or withdrew it completely when the
Warren Court applied the principle to the point where it really bites
to custodial interrogation. Thurman Arnold may have provided as
good an explanation as any for why Gideon received a warm reception
but Mapp and Miranda evoked a hostile reaction. Arnold made the
195. See Janis,428 U.S. at 452, n.24 and accompanying text.
196. Gideon v. wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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point long before the Warren Court ever assembled. Too many people, he commented, are roused by any violation of "the symbol of a
ceremonial trial," but "left unmoved by an ordinary nonceremonial
injustice."' 97
Is Avy DECISION RESTRICriNG POLICE POWERS LIKELY TO BE

CRITICIZED?
It was not the Warren Court's efforts to strengthen the rights of
the accused in the courtroom, but its "activism" in the pre-trial "police
practices" area that led many to believe that it was "too soft" on
crime. It was the Court's search and seizure and confession cases that
made it a major political issue in the 1968 presidential campaign.
It is hard to think of a single significant ruling against the police
by any Supreme Court that has not evoked strong criticism - and
from opposite directions. Either we are told that the ruling turns too
heavily on the particular facts of the case and thus fails to provide
clear-cut guidance for the future or we are told that the ruling is too
broad and inflexible and thus demonstrates that the Court is acting
like a legislature rather than a court. Almost every Supreme Court
decision that has imposed some restraints on law enforcement can be,
and I believe has been, criticized on one of these grounds or the other.
Is it any wonder that one gets the uncomfortable feeling that the
police just want the Court to go away? That they resent and resist any
external control - whether it comes from a civil rights commission or
a civilian review board or a court?
When Escobedo was decided in 1964, it was severely criticized for
being much too fuzzy - although it contained some sweeping language it also contained very narrow language that arguably limited the
case to its special facts. 198

Then came Miranda.

The Miranda Court seemed to be responding to the criticism of
Escobedo. This time it seemed to be striving hard to provide the guidance it had failed to furnish in Escobedo. But this time the Justices
caught heavy fire for not handling the cases before them on an individualized basis, but providing too much guidance in the abstract; for
deciding too many things in "one gulp"; and for promulgating rules
that were too specific, too rigid and too inflexible.
197. THURMAN W. ARNOLD,Ti SyMBoLs OF GOVERNMENT 142 (Harbinger ed., Harcourt,
Brace & World 1962).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31 and 43-44.
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The requirement that the police issue the now-familiar warnings,
and obtain valid waivers, before subjecting a custodial suspect to interrogation is probably the feature of the Miranda case that has
caught the heaviest fire. But this aspect of the case should have disturbed law enforcement officials the least. As Professor Schulhofer
has pointed out, three distinct steps were involved in Miranda: (1)
informal pressure to speak (i.e., pressure not backed by legal process
or any formal sanction) can constitute "compulsion" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment; (2) this element of informal compulsion
is present, indeed inherent, in custodial interrogation; and (3) the
specified warnings or some equally effective alternative device is
needed to dispel the pressure of custodial interrogation. 199
The first two steps constitute "the core of Miranda.'20 0 If it had
stopped with the first two steps and left law enforcement officials to
guess at what countermeasures were needed to dispel the pressure of
custodial interrogation, the Court would have incurred far more
criticism.2° '
The required warnings may be too feeble a means of dispelling
the pressure but it is hard to criticize the warnings on the ground that
they "handcuff" the police. It would be more accurate to say that they
serve to liberate the police. They enable the police to question a custodial suspect without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment.2°2
Dm

TH

WARREN COuRT's REFORM EFFORT COME AT A BAD

TIME? COULD rr HAVE COME AT A BETTER

TiME?

In his lively book, The Self-Inflicted Wound (an account of the
Warren Court's revolution in criminal procedure), former New York
Times Supreme Court reporter Fred Graham observes:
History has played cruel jokes before, but few can compare with the
coincidence in timing between the rise in crime, violence and racial

tensions [and] the Supreme Court's campaign to strengthen the
rights of criminal suspects against the state.... The Court's reform
effort could have come at almost any time in the recent past... [at a
time] when it could have20 taken
root before crime became the prob3
lem that it has become.
199. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, ReconsideringMiranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 435, 436 (1987).
200. Id.

201. See id. at 454.

202. See id.

203.

FRED P. GRAm,

THE SEL-IwrUcrnD WouND 4 (1970).
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When was that? According to the media, the claims of law enforcement officials and the statements of politicians, we have always been
experiencing a "crime crisis" - at no time in our recent, or not-sorecent, past has there been a time when "society" could afford a
2 4
strengthening or expansion of the rights of the accused. 0
In 1943, in McNabb v. United States,2 °5 in the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of federal criminal justice,
the Court held that voluntary confessions should be excluded from
evidence if they were obtained while the suspect was being held in
violation of federal requirements that he promptly be taken before a
committing magistrate. The McNabb Court tried to do for the federal
courts what, a quarter-century later, Miranda was designed to do for
state, as well as federal, courts: by-pass the frustrating "swearing contests" over the nature of the secret interrogation and reduce, if not
eliminate, both police temptation and opportunity to coerce suspects
into making incriminating statements. The McNabb doctrine sought
to do this by focusing on a relatively objective factor - the length of
time a suspect was held by the police before being brought to a judicial officer to be advised of his rights.
Although it placed less restrictions on federal police than Miranda was to place on all police a quarter-century later, the McNabb
rule was severely criticized by many law enforcement authorities and
many members of Congress for barring the use of voluntary confessions. For example, in his testimony before a House Subcommittee,
the then head of the District of Columbia Police Department called
McNabb "one of the greatest handicaps that has ever confronted law
'206
enforcement officers.
Police officials and politicians were not the only ones unhappy
with the McNabb decision. Most of the judges of the lower federal
courts "were unsympathetic, if not openly hostile, toward a rule which
suppressed evidence not only relevant but also cogent and often crucial in order to effectuate what seemed to them to be an exaggerated
concern for individual rights. 2 °7
204. See generally Yale Kamisar, When the Cops Were Not "Handcuffed," N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
7, 1965, reprinted in CRIME AND CRIMINAL Jus-ncE 46 (Donald R. Cressey ed. 1971).

205. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
206. A Bill to Safeguard the Admission of Evidence in Certain Cases, Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the Comm. on the Judiciary,House of Representatives on H.R. 3690, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1943) (testimony of Major Edward J. Kelly, Superintendent of Police, District of
Columbia).

207. James E. Hogan & Joseph M. Snee, S.J., The McNabb-Maflory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale
and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1, 5 (1958).
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A year after the McNabb decision, at a time when a bill to repudiate it was gathering much support, the Court took another look at
the doctrine in the Mitchell case.2 ° s With one eye on Congress, and
stung by strong criticism from the bench and bar, as well as from police and prosecutors, the Court backed off, writing an opinion which
could be read as limiting McNabb to its particular facts.20 9
As James Hogan and Joseph Snee, co-authors of the leading article on the McNabb doctrine, have noted:
The Supreme Court's decision in the Mitchell case sent the McNabb
rule into eclipse. To the judges of the lower federal courts, who had
viewed the earlier decision with ill-concealed astonishment and apprehension, the Mitchell case signaled a face-saving retreat by the
Court from the untenable position which it had occupied the year
before.2 10
Some years later, the Court revived and reaffirmed McNabb, first
in Upshaw v. United States2" and then in Mallory v. United States. 2
However, the storm of controversy over the rule never subsided:
The Mallory decision was greeted by law enforcement officials of
the District of Columbia (where its impact was greatest) with something bordering on panic. The Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department declared (hyperbolically, it is hoped) that the decision
renders the Police Department "almost totally ineffective." There
were loud demands for a legislative re-examination of the law of
arrest, and in the Congress bills were introduced either to expand
of allowable detention or to abolish the McNabb rule
the period
itself. 213
After Mallory, more bills were introduced to repeal, or at least
soften, the doctrine and in 1968 a law was finally enacted that badly
crippled it.214 (Because the McNabb-Mallory doctrine was a rule of
evidence formulated in the exercise of the Court's supervisory authority over the administration of federal criminal justice, it was subject to
repeal or revision by the Congress.)
208. Mitchell v. United States, 321 U.S. 756 (1944).
209. See Fred E. Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court,43 ILLL. REv. 442, 451-53 (1948).
210. Hogan & Snee, supra note 207, at 8.
211. 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
212. 354 U.S. 449 (1957). From 1957 on, the rule was often called the McNabb-Mallory Rule
or simply the Mallory rule.
213. Hogan & Snee, supra note 207, at 17. The claim that the McNabb-Mallory rule adversely affected law enforcement in the District of Columbia is not supported by the available
data. See Yale Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-ProsecutionOriented Critics of the Courts, 49

CoRNFU.

L.Q. 436, 464-71 (1964).

214. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501 (a) & (c) (1988).
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The experience with the McNabb-Mallory rule is strong evidence
that the 1940s and 1950s were hardly auspicious times for the Court to
do what it was to do in Miranda - deem custodial interrogation by
state, as well as federal police, "inherently coercive." Indeed, when, in
the 1944 case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 15 a majority of the Court
called thirty-six hours of continuous relay interrogation"inherently coercive," it evoked a powerful dissent by three Justices who severely
criticized the majority for departing from the traditional "voluntariness" test.216
In Watts v. Indiana, another coerced confession case, decided in
1949, concurring Justice Robert Jackson warned that our Bill of
Rights, as interpreted by the Court up to that time, imposed "the maximum restrictions upon the power of organized society over the individual that are compatible with the maintenance of organized society
itself' - good reason for not indulging in any further expansion of
17
2

them.

Were the 1950s a good time to impose the search and seizure exclusionary rule on the states? When the California Supreme Court
adopted the exclusionary rule on its own initiative in 1955,218 the cries
of protest were almost deafening. Prominent law enforcement officials called the exclusionary rule "the 'Magna Carta' for the criminals"
and "catastrophic as far as efficient law enforcement is concerned"
and warned that it had "broken the very backbone of narcotics
enforcement. 2 1 9
What of the 1930s? In 1935 Governor Herbert Lehman opened a
conference on crime by warning:
There is no question that in recent years there has come a substantial increase in organized crime. The professional criminal has become bolder ....

215. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
216. See 322 U.S. at 156 (Jackson, J., joined by Roberts & Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting).
217. 338 U.S. 49, 57, 61 (1949).
218. People v. Cahan, 282 P. 2d 905 (Cal. 1955). For an explanation by the author of the
Cahan opinion of why the California Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule six years
before the U.S. Supreme Court imposed the rule on the states, see Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v.
Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319, 321-22 (1962).
219. See Yale Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories,"
53 J. Crum. L., CRwNOLOGY & PoUcE Sci. 171, 188, 190 (1962) (quoting the statements of
officials). The predictions and descriptions of near-disaster that greeted and followed the adoption of the exclusionary rule in California find virtually no support in the available data. See Id.
at 184-90.
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We must take steps to increase the certainty of punishment following crime ....
We must have fewer legal technical loopholes in trials and appeals
220

The New York gathering on crime was not a unique event in
those troubled times. The U.S. Attorney General also called a conference on crime and similar conferences were held in various states.22 '
The public was so alarmed by the apparent increase in crime that a
U.S. Senate investigating committee, chaired by Royal Copeland of
New York, scoured the country for information and advice which
could lead to a national legislative solution.2 ' 2 At these 1933 Congressional hearings, witnesses attacked virtually every procedural safeguard found in the Bill of Rights
Going back still further, in 1931 the famous criminologist Harry
Elmer Barnes voiced fear that the repeal of prohibition would trigger
"an avalanche of crime" - as thousands of crooks, chased out of the
booze business, would return to their old rackets.22 4 He warned that
"the only effective check we can think of... would be to turn our
cities over for the time being to the United States Army and
Marines." 2 Transferring the Marines from Central America to the
streets of Chicago, added Barnes, "might not only promote the checking of the crime menace but also solve at one and the same time our
diplomatic relations with Central America."2 2 6

"Every generation supposes that its own problems are new, unknown to its forefathers."2 7 To most of those who lived during that
period, the 1930s (as usual) was not a time for strengthening the rights
220. Proceedings, The Governor's Conference on Crime, the Criminal and Society, STATE OF

NENv YORK 25, 26, 27 (1935). The next day a former governor, Nathan L. Miller, took up the
theme. To the accompaniment of applause, he "suggest[ed] that the police ought not to be hampered in dealing with the enemies of society" and he warned that "in a war upon crime, the
primary consideration must be not the criminal but the protection of society from the criminal."
Id. at 55.
221. See Herbert Wechsler, A Caveat on Crime Control,27 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 629
(1937).
222. See A Resolution Authorizing an Investigationof the Matter of So-Called "Rackets" With

a View to Their Suppression, Hearings Before Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce
Pursuantto S. Res. 74, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933).

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See generally Kamisar, supra note 204.
HARRY E. BARNEs, BATTLING THE CRIME WAVE 87-88 (1931).
Id. at 88.
Id.
Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Crime and Confession, 79 HARV. L. REv. 21, 32-33 (1965).

HeinOnline -- 31 Tulsa L.J. 49 1995-1996

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31:1

of the accused. Rather it seemed to be a period when (as usual) criminal procedural safeguards had already been stretched to the breaking
point.
LEGISLATIVE RULEMAKING VS. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION
MAKING

I am sometimes asked if I would still be in favor of the search and
seizure exclusionary rule or Mirandaif the legislature were to provide
more effective, or at least equally effective, protection for criminal
suspects. My answer is the same one Charles Black gave when asked
whether he would still be against capital punishment if he were sure it
were being administered with perfect fairness, with divinely scrupulous and infallible fairness. Professor Black replied that that was like
asking him, "Would you take trains if the earth were made flat, or
would you fear they would run off the edge?"'
In 1968 the Congress dealt with the confession problem. How?
By "repealing" both Escobedo and Miranda and offering nothing
plausible in its place - nothing but the old elusive, unruly and largely
22 9
unworkable "totality of the circumstances" "voluntariness" test.

Judge Henry Friendly, the most powerful critic of the Warren
Court's criminal procedure cases, warned that "the situation with
which the Court was confronted in Mirandawas sufficiently disturbing
that those of us [who criticize the case] ought to search hard for alternatives rather than take the easy course of returning simply to the rule
'2 30
that statements to the police are admissible unless 'involuntary.'
But Congress did take that easy course.
One might say that Congress pretended that Mirandanever happened because it believed that violations of that case rarely if ever
produced an untrustworthy confession. But the 1968 Congress also
legislated in another area -

lineups.

228. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Death Penalty Now, 51 TuLt L. REv. 429, 455 (1977).
229. Although Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 purports
to "repeal" Mirandain federal prosecutions, 18 USCA § 3501(a), the Department of Justice has
studiously avoided the statute. See Henry J. Friendly, The Constitution 24-25 (U.S. Dep't. of
Justice Bicentennial Lecture Series, 1976). Recently, however, Justice Antonin Scalia announced that he "will no longer be open to the argument that this Court should continue to
ignore the commands of § 3501 simply because the Executive declines to insist that we observe
them." Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2358 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
230. Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. Rv. 671, 711-12 (1968).
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As discussed earlier, 31 a year after Miranda, the Court at long
last turned its attention to the problem of misidentification - a matter of serious concern in the administration of justice. "The problem
here is not that of releasing an obviously guilty defendant because of
the system's failure to respect his rights ...[but] one of convicting the
,, 32
innocent. Although the Court dealt with the problem of misidentification
by applying the right to counsel to lineups, this may not have been the
best way to deal with the problem. It certainly is not the only way to
do so. For example, in order to ensure that lineups are fairly conducted, a legislature might require that they be photographed and
videotaped and that these records be produced in court. Or a legislature might remove identification procedures entirely from the police
and place them in the hands of an expert and neutral administrative
agency.
What alternative device did the Congress choose? None. It simply enacted a law purporting to repeal the lineup decisions.3 3 I believe Francis Allen expressed it best when he said that the
Congressional response (or lack of response) to this critical problem
'2 4
was "deplorable. " 3
It is sometimes said that the Warren Court's activism in the criminal procedure area removed both the incentive and opportunity to
deal with these matters by legislative reform. Indeed, Chief Justice
Warren Burger once said that "the continued existence of [the exclusionary rule] inhibits the development of rational alternatives." '3 5
However, it is hard to take this argument seriously.
For many decades a large number of states had no exclusionary
rule, yet none of them developed any meaningful alternative to the
rule. Some forty-seven years passed between the time the federal
courts adopted the exclusionary rule and the time the Court finally
imposed the rule on the states, but in all that time none of the twenty231. See supra text at notes 132-33.
232. Francis A. Allen, The JudicialQuestfor PenalJustice: The Warren Courtand the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL L.F. 518, 542.
233. Although litle II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 purports
to "repeal" the 1967 lineup decisions, this Congressional action has "proved to be meaningless.
The inferior federal courts have considered themselves bound by the Supreme Court's reading of
the Constitution rather than that of the Congress and have appeared to ignore the new statute."
Carl McGowan, ConstitutionalInterpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 WM. & MARY L.
Rnv. 235, 249 (1970).
234. Allen, supra note 232, at 542.
235. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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four states which still admitted illegally seized evidence on the eve of
Mapp2 36 had developed an effective alternative to the rule. In short, a
half-century of post-Weeks "freedom to experiment" with various
ways to discourage police misconduct did not produce any meaningful
alternative to the exclusionary rule anywhere.
One critic of the exclusionary rule has maintained that no alternative to the exclusionary rule will emerge until the rule is abolished
because "[s]o long as we keep the rule, the police are not going to
investigate and discipline their men, and thus sabotage prosecutions
by invalidating the admissibility of vital evidence. '237 But this argument is not persuasive. How does the fear of "sabotaging" prosecutions inhibit law enforcement administrators from disciplining officers
for committing the many unlawful searches that turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, and about which the criminal
courts do nothing?
To be sure, there is no shortage of theoretically possible ways,
aside from the exclusion of evidence, to make the Fourth Amendment
viable. But various commentators have called attention to the need
for an effective alternative to the exclusionary rule and underscored
the inadequacies of existing tort remedies or criminal sanctions
against transgressing police since the 1930s.3 8 The problem is not a
lack of imagination or intellectual capacity, but rather a lack of political will.
Is there any reason to believe that today's or tomorrow's politicians are, or will be, any less fearful of crime and any more concerned
about protecting people under investigation by the police than the
politicians of any other era? Is there any reason to think that the
lawmakers of our day are any more willing than their predecessors to
invigorate tort and criminal remedies against law enforcement officials
who commit excesses in their overzealous efforts to contend with
"criminals" and "suspected criminals"?

236. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 205, 224-25 (1960).
237. Malcolm R. Wilkey, The ExclusionaryRule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICA.
TuRE 215, 217-18 (1978).

238. See the articles collected in Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of Criminal
Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano,23 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 537,564, n.88 (1990). See also id.
at 562, n.82.
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WAS THE WARREN COURT'S REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE BOUND TO FAIL?
Craig Bradley has forcefully argued that the Warren Court's
revolution in criminal procedure has failed and that, given the inherent limitations of the judicial process, it was bound to do so - "no
Supreme Court, no matter how competent and regardless of its political leanings, could have done much better."2 3' 9 Observes Bradley:
[I]n the area of criminal procedure, unlike any other field of
Supreme Court endeavor, the doctrine must be clear, it must be
complete, and it must be stable. It is in these respects that criminal
procedure law has failed. The usual leisurely manner of constitutional decision making where the Supreme Court announces a rule
one year and then answers the questions to which that rule gives
rise over the next fifteen or twenty years is inappropriate in this
field, where the police need clear guidance and where the penalty
for police mistakes is high.
The Court is never, by its nature, able to sit back and decide, apart
from the cases before it, what the entire body of confession or
search law should be like or to examine comprehensively what police behavior, in terms of arrest, booking, interrogation, identification procedures, and so on, is reasonable and what is not. A casespecific system necessarily leads to a patchwork system and to resulting confusion on the part of everyone involved in the process.
The worst problem with the case method ...is that it is not forward
looking. It does not allow that Court, as an ordinary rulemaking
body would, to anticipate future cases and to craft its rules, and the
exceptions to those rules, with such cases in mind. Thus the Court is
invariably left in the position of declaring a partial rule, such as the
rule [about] when questioning must cease upon a suspect's invocation of the right to silence, that fails to deal adequately with the
majority of subsequent cases that present related issues.

Few, if any, would deny that in the field of criminal procedure
legislative rulemaking has advantages over constitutional decision
making. But are the courts supposed to do nothing in the absence of
239. CRAir M. BRADLEY, THE FALURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 62
(1993). See also Allen, supra note 232, at 54041 (despite its "ingenious, persistent, and some
may feel, heroic efforts to overcome the inherent limitations of judicial power, the [Warren]
Court attempted more than it could possibly achieve"); Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme
Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 788 (1970) (stating
that the U.S. Supreme Court "is uniquely unable to take a comprehensive view of the subject of

suspects' rights").
240. Bradley, supra note 239, at 39, 55, 71.
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legislative rulemaking? A legislature never has to act, but a court
does; it must decide the case at hand.
I think there is much truth in Anthony Amsterdam's observation
that "[t]he judicial 'activism' that [the Court's conservative critics deplored a generation ago], usually citing the Court's 'handcuffing' of
the police, has been the almost inevitable consequence of the failure
of other agencies of law to assume responsibility for regulating police
practices."" 1 As the late Herbert Packer said of the Warren Court's
revolution in criminal procedure at a time when it was still taking
place, "it is naive or disingenuous to expect the Court to hold its hand
when its hand is the only one raised or raisable."' 42
Professor Packer called the Warren Court's landmark decisions
"moves of desperation" - there was a law-making vacuum into which
the Court felt it had to rush. Nobody else was policing the police, so
the Justices felt they had to do So.243
It is easy enough to poke holes in this development, observed
Packer, but what is the alternative? "If we can look nowhere else but
to the courts," wrote Packer, "it is silly to ask whether the courts are
doing an optimal job. One might as well ask whether surgery is optimally undertaken with a carving knife without revealing that on the
particular occasion the surgeon has no other instruments at his
disposal."'
The Warren Court did not accomplish nearly as much as its supporters hoped and its many critics in and out of law enforcement circles feared. But I, for one, am grateful that, for a time, the Supreme
Court used its judicial resources in a determined effort "to alter significantly the nature of American criminal justice in the interest of a
larger realization of the constitutional ideal of liberty under the
law.,

24 5

Someday, perhaps (but not, I am afraid, in the lifetime of anyone
now reading this article), the Court will be able to put down its carving knife in favor of the legislature's scalpel. In the meantime, it is
comforting to know that, although battered and bruised, most of the
241.
242.
243.
244.

Amsterdam, supra note 239, at 790.
Herbert L. Packer, Policing the Police, The New Republic, Sept. 4, 1965, at 17, 19.
See id.
Ild. See also Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, The Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 . CUNM.

L., CRIMINOLOGY & PoUcE Sci. 238, 240 (1966).
245. Allen, supra note 232, at 525.
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Warren Court's famous precedents remain in place - waiting for a
future Court to reclaim the torch.2 46
There is a distinct possibility, of course, that another Supreme
Court will not reclaim the torch (at least not for a long time). Even
so-

By reason of what the Warren Court said and did, we now perceive
as problems what too often were not seen as problems before. This
is the dynamic of change, and that fact may well be more significant
than many of the solutions proposed by the Warren Court. 247

246. A few state supreme courts, it should be noted, have picked up the torch. See the
authorities collected and discussed in YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 57-63 (8th ed. 1994).
247. Allen, supra note 232, at 539.
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